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PREFACE
Mine action is often seen as an exclusively post-conflict activity. While such a perspective is 
understandable, it is nevertheless a limited view. An end to fighting does offer the best conditions 
for clearing battlegrounds of  landmines, or for raising awareness of  the dangers that mines and 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) present, but focusing on the peace ignores the hardship in-
flicted on civilians by landmines throughout the war. Indeed, the majority of  conflicts today hap-
pen within the borders of  States, pitting armed non-State actors (NSAs) against the forces of  the 
government. The drawn-out nature of  many of  these confrontations, lasting months if  not years 
and often involving extensive mine-laying, demands that we not wait until the guns are silent and 
that landmines become a “legacy” of  war before doing something to relieve the threat to civilians. 
Co-organised by Geneva Call and the Non-State Actors Working Group (NSAWG) of  the Inter-
national Campaign to Ban Landmines, the workshop on “Mine Action in the Midst of  Internal 
Conflict” was held on Sunday 27 November 2006, the day before the opening of  the Sixth Meeting 
of  States Parties to the Ottawa Convention in Zagreb, Croatia
The aim of  the workshop was to better understand mine action in the midst of  internal conflict 
through an exchange of  views and experiences between mine activists and government representa-
tives, to examine questions faced by such operations, and to look for possible strategies for mine 
action during an armed conflict, as well as at the benefits of  doing so.
The following report is a summary of  the workshop, a compilation of  the main presentations 
made in its course, and some final reflections on mine action in the midst of  conflict. The principal 
conclusions were that: 
	Mine action in the midst of  internal conflict is possible according to the limits imposed by 
the war;
	Mine action should be carried out for humanitarian purposes and not by the armed forces 
involved in the conflict;
	Mine action should be a depoliticised process that prioritises civilian welfare;
	A failure to perform mine action in the course of  an internal conflict may be considered to 
be non-respect for the obligations of  the Treaty by a State Party. Indeed, the State should 
facilitate, or at least not prevent, any mine action efforts by third parties or armed NSAs in 
areas no longer under its control but still under its jurisdiction; and
	Mine action can create confidence-building possibilities for opposing sides.
For those present, the feasibility of  mine action during an internal conflict, especially in areas where 
fighting has abated, is equivalent to a responsibility to carry out such action. We hope that the 
workshop and this report will contribute to the debate on this issue in the future.
Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey, Geneva Call
     Simona Beltrami,  NSA Working Group - ICBL
September 2006
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WORKSHOP: MINE ACTION 
IN THE MIDST OF INTERNAL CONFLICT
“It’s not necessary to have peace to start saving lives”
On the eve of  the Sixth Meeting of  the States Parties to the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition 
of  the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of  Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruc-
tion, between 28 November and 2 December 2005 in Zagreb, Geneva Call co-organised a work-
shop on “Mine Action in the Midst of  Internal Conflict” with the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines Non-State Actors Working Group (ICBL-NSA Working Group).
As Commandant E. Lino of  the Sudan People’s Liberation Army made clear: “it’s not necessary to 
have peace to start saving lives”. This was the dominant theme of  the workshop that took place 
on 27 November 2005.
Those present included representatives of  States, UN agencies, humanitarian non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), demining specialists, Mine Risk Education professionals, mine victim as-
sistance experts and other international organisations such as the International Committee of  the 
Red Cross and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.
Background
The number of  internal conflicts today far exceeds the frequency of  inter-State wars; more and 
more rebel groups, liberation movements and guerrillas are active in open hostilities with govern-
ment troops. The asymmetry of  such conflicts, in which often under-resourced non-State actors 
(NSAs) confront the generally well-financed forces of  the State, has made the landmine - cheap 
and easy to manufacture - into a weapon of  choice for many armed groups. 

















Participants in the workshop - Photo Credit: Geneva Call
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“Weapon of  the poor” it may be, but many casualties of  NSA landmines and improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) are often not military personnel or hardware, but civilians caught up in the conflict. 
Victim-activated anti-personnel landmines and IEDs are by nature indiscriminate weapons, whose 
use across a war zone leaves a lasting threat both to the people who live there and those who try 
to flee. Realising the death and injury, not to say economic and social damage that such mines can 
cause in the long-term, it is vital that humanitarian measures are taken as early as possible to ad-
dress the problem; this includes mine action in the midst of  the conflict itself. 
However, establishing programmes of  mine action (advocacy, mine clearance, victim assistance, 
Mine Risk Education and stockpile destruction) during ongoing hostilities presents many diffi-
culties. For example, the mine activist must face the daily threats of  war and the frustration of  
a cleared area being re-mined. Moreover, there is the problem of  gaining the acceptance of  the 
government concerned, the consideration of  what role the regular armed forces should play, the 
choice of  which organisation should be made responsible for mine action, the concern of  how 
to get financial support for operations and the question of  how to co-operate with an NSA in the 
name of  mine action without giving it recognition or legitimacy. 
The workshop aimed to share experiences and perspectives on mine action in the midst of  internal 
conflict, and to find some solutions to the questions that this work confronts.
Summary of  Workshop Opening Statements
In her opening remarks, Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey, President of  Geneva Call, posed four such ques-
tions based on Geneva Call’s experience: 
•	 Is an agreement or engagement with an NSA a precondition for mine action during the 
conflict? 
•	 Which actors are appropriate for undertaking mine action? 
•	 What should the role of  the concerned State be? 
•	 If  a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) does not co-operate with mine action taking 
place on its territory in the course of  a conflict, could this be considered as non-compliance 
with the State’s treaty obligations? 
Mr Alvaro Jimenez, Coordinator of  the Colombian Campaign Against Landmines and Co-chair of  
the ICBL-NSA Working Group, reiterated the importance of  resolving these issues, as well as the 
need for NSAs and State actors to reach humanitarian agreements and to facilitate mine action. 
 
Ambassador Jean Lint, Director for Africa of  the Belgian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs and President 
of  the Fourth Meeting of  States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, summarized how the goal of  en-
couraging armed non-State actors to cease and renounce the use, stockpiling, production and trans-
fer of  anti-personnel mines has been integrated into the Ottawa Process. Praising Geneva Call’s 
efforts to make this aim a reality, he underlined that engaging NSAs in a landmine ban in the course 
of  an armed conflict can be conducive to confidence-building between the parties to the ban, as 
well as to promoting the Ottawa process if  ever the NSA goes on to join the national government. 
he concluded with the behest that all actors, both State and non-State, “spare no effort to tackle 
the problem of  anti-personnel mines”.
Dr. Dijana Plestina, Advisor on Mine Action to the Minister of  Foreign Affairs, Croatia and Sec-
retary-General of  the Sixth Meeting of  the States Parties, took the floor as the last speaker in the 
introductory section. When she first began working on the MBT, she was most surprised by the 
lack of  attention it gave to NSA landmine use. Indeed, she was struck by the futility of  a State 
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becoming party to the landmine ban whilst armed groups continued to deploy these weapons on 
its territory. Dr. Plestina has long-since supported the work of  Geneva Call in addressing this blind 
spot in the MBT.
Nevertheless, she understood the caution of  some States about beginning dialogue with an NSA. 
Even so, she stressed the obligation of  all signatories to the MBT to work for universalising the 
Treaty’s norms to all mine users, including NSAs. This means co-operation with organisations 
working with States within which NSAs operate, to facilitate dialogue for a total mine ban. 
However, Dr. Plestina also urged caution. Dealing with NSAs in the name of  achieving a universal 
mine ban must remain at all times a humanitarian activity, conducted with the cooperation of  the 
States concerned, and never transgressing on their sovereignty. Failing in this would risk damaging 
the credibility of  all attempts to work for the universalization of  the MBT.
Summary of  Case Studies 
A number of  case studies of  mine action in the midst of  internal conflict were discussed at the 
meeting. 
Colombia
Ms Sofia Reyes, Social Communicator of  humanitarian Spaces in southern Bolívar - Peace Labora-
tory, Colombia, and Mrs Diana Roa-Castro, shared their experiences from the village of  Micoahu-
mado and surrounding settlements of  Morales town in southern Bolívar Department, Colombia. 
Their fate to live in an area rich in natural resources and strategic importance meant that the people 
of  Micoahumado found themselves caught up in the conflict tearing apart their region. Widespread 
mining in areas of  civilian importance such as the local aqueduct, soccer pitch and arterial road, 
meant that daily life for the community was dictated by the rhythms of  violence. 
Confronted with this reality, the community chose a proactive response. They entered into a dia-
logue with local guerrilla groups and unilaterally declared Micoahumado a humanitarian space. All 
of  this was part of  what later became known as the “Sovereign Communitarian Process for life, 
justice and peace of  Micoahumado”. 
The initiative won a pledge from the ELN to move the conflict further from people’s houses and 
to demine the aqueduct. Although the situation remained difficult, as time went on the Sovereign 
Communitarian Process gathered momentum and attracted support from several external actors, 
including the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines and Geneva Call. 
Together, these actors have followed a strategy of  “protection and guarantees” promoted through 
dialogue. This approach has yielded further advances in local demining projects, not least in respect 
to the commitment of  the ELN to carry out its own demining programme on an area including 
the vital road.
Members of  the community are now in negotiation with the Colombian Government, seeking for-
mal verification and support from the national authorities for further development of  the project 
and the region. Moreover, Micoahumado’s successes have led to other similar initiatives in the 
regional context. 
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Mrs Diana Roa-Castro, Information Officer, from the Landmines and Explosive Remnants of  War 
Focal Point Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs of  OCHA in Colombia, ex-
plained the internal conflict in that country, as well as the progress of  landmine action therein. She 
pointed out that the Colombian Government does not recognise the dispute as more than “a very 
serious social problem”, but asserted that there “are arguments enough” to view it as a situation of  
internal armed conflict. Certainly, due to a series of  failed peace processes and little mine action, 
Colombia remains a country severely polluted by landmines. 
Mrs Roa-Castro underlined that NSAs have been the main culprits of  mine use since the Govern-
ment of  Colombia signed the MBT. The FARC is the principle perpetrator, followed by the ELN 
and the AUC, and hostility between these groups has aggravated the mine problem further. 
Mine action in this conflict is particularly difficult for a number of  reasons. The majority of  land-
mines that are deployed are improvised explosive devices, which are of  multiple shapes and explo-
sive-content, making them hard to identify for the purposes of  Mine Risk Education and demining, 
as well as causing wounds that vary significantly in severity.
Legislative efforts to address deficiencies in mine action have been made, but they have proven 
“precarious”. Indeed, there are no humanitarian demining projects underway in Colombia, with the 
military taking charge of  the sporadic operations that do occur. This frustrating situation has led to 
untrained civilians sometimes attempting to demine their own communities.
Such chaotic and ineffective mine action is partly rooted in the lack of  systematic recording of  
where accidents occur and how, and reliable knowledge of  the mine situation in Colombia. Clearly, 
without this information mine action cannot be properly planned. Indeed, it is largely within the 
sphere of  Mine Risk Education that activity has taken place under the conditions of  the armed 
conflict. 
However, the main obstacle to mine action is the continued existence of  the conflict, and the use 
of  these weapons by armed non-State actors. The ebb and flow of  the fighting has meant that 
mine-free areas later become mined, few contaminated regions are marked or recorded, and access 
to mined zones is made difficult by ongoing hostilities. In short, mine action is hard to plan and 
complicated to execute, and this is aggravated by Bogotá’s staunch position against negotiation 
with NSAs.
Mrs Roa-Castro urged pragmatism as the best means to mitigate the impact of  mines and carry out 
effective mine action. This may include dialogue with NSAs in order to undertake programmes in 
areas where they have de facto control. In this respect, she referred to Geneva Call’s work in pro-
moting the role of  NSAs in the solution to the landmine problem, as well as the indirect benefits to 
confidence building between parties to the conflict that its activities in Colombia have brought. 
She concluded with a call to the “humanitarian imperative, framed in the principles of  human-
ity, impartiality and neutrality” as a basis for mine action, and for overcoming the political and 
technical obstacles outlined above. She suggested that this imperative, once presented in inclusive 
dialogue with NSAs, may well see the way clear to mine action within the conflict. Indeed, she as-
serted, “there is no war…not mediated by human beings able to reason in the light of  the humani-
tarian need”. In this respect, she underlined the important role that mine affected communities and 
NGOs can play in this mediation process.
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Sudan
Mr Peter Moszynski, former Landmine Monitor Researcher, discussed mine action in Sudan, citing 
this country as a “test case” for mine action during conflict. Twenty-two years of  war has left Sudan 
as one of  the most poverty-stricken and mine-affected countries in the world. 
The conflict between the government in the north and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ 
Army (SPLM/A) in the south has been the main source of  this mine contamination. Nevertheless, 
since 1997, the SPLM/A has sought to lessen the impact of  landmines on the civilian population 
under its control. There have been domestic initiatives, including the foundation of  an indigenous 
mine action organisation, and international projects such as the signing of  the Geneva Call Deed 
of  Commitment.
However, during the years of  conflict, there was very little co-ordinated North-South mine action 
in Sudan, despite the efforts of  UNMAS to develop a “one country” approach. Even so, the Bur-
genstock Nuba ceasefire from January 2002 did allow for some co-operative mine action training 
for deminers from both sides to the conflict. 
Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of  early 2005, things have changed somewhat. Indeed, 
as Mr Moszynski describes: “[t]here has been a rapid internationalisation of  mine action… as mul-
tilateral agencies… overshadow the local initiatives.” 
Nevertheless, there remains no unified national mine action authority in the country. Responsibili-
ties are still shared between the North and the South with the support of  the uN Mine Action 
Office. Consequently, despite efforts to develop national mine action cooperation and the hope 
that this might foster peace and confidence-building, the complexities of  Sudan and the failure 
to achieve a comprehensive peace deal for the entire country, has meant that humanitarian mine 
action has mostly been conditional on the vagaries of  the peace processes, rather than actually 
promoting them. 
Sri Lanka
Unfortunately, scheduled speaker, Mr Chandru Pararajasingham, Programme Coordinator from the 
Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) of  Sri Lanka could not attend the workshop due to 
sickness. Ms Katherine Kramer, Geneva Call Programme Director for Asia, spoke on his behalf  in 
discussing Sri Lanka’s experiences of  mine action in the course of  conflict, as well as TRO’s efforts 
to counter the mine problem in the Northeast. 
Through a discussion of  the modern history of  the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, Ms Kramer traced 
the development of  the landmine problem on the island. Indeed, the cycles of  civil war and cease-
fire between the Liberation Tamil Tigers of  Eelam (LTTE) and government forces have seen the 
widespread defensive and offensive emplacement of  landmines in the Northeast by both sides.
Significantly, mine action has taken place in spite of  hostilities. In fact, the first demining opera-
tions for humanitarian purposes began in 1999 in Tamil-held areas and were expanded after the 
2002 ceasefire when a number of  local and international organisations were able to undertake mine 
clearance in both government and LTTE-controlled regions. Mine Risk Education and victim as-
sistance have also occurred with varying degrees of  success.
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Ms Kramer reflected on the political dimension of  the mine problem. It is intimately linked to the 
country’s peace process, she said, not least through the rehabilitation and resettlement programme 
for internally-displaced persons, that is part of  the ceasefire agreement and dependent on mine 
clearance. Even so, and despite pressure from international and national quarters, the LTTE and 
Government of  Sri Lanka have been reticent about committing to a mine ban as long as there is 
no further advancement towards peace. “This said”, Ms Kramer added, “even as peace talks have 
stalled, significant demining activities have continued unabated and steadfast”. 
To conclude she cited some of  the challenges that present themselves to mine action in Sri Lanka. 
Most of  these arise directly from the existence of  the conflict, or rather the situation of  “no war/ 
no peace”. For instance, mine action teams face difficulties in moving their equipment between 
government and LTTE-controlled areas. Moreover, distrust between the parties to the conflict, 
coupled with political and military uncertainties, has hampered progress towards both parties ac-
cepting a mine ban. Certainly the nature of  the cease-fire has meant that mines could be used at 
any point if  hostilities were to break out again. 
Despite all of  these challenges, Ms Kramer asserted that the mine action that has taken place in Sri 
Lanka has reduced, and raised awareness of, the landmine threat within affected populations. The 
evidence that no new mines have been planted is encouraging. Be that as it may, a total ban on the 
weapons by both parties to the conflict might be a factor in persuading the international commu-
nity to support more mine action in Sri Lanka in the future.
Discussion
Legal Aspects of  Mine Action in Internal Conflict
Mrs Kathleen Lawand, Legal Adviser to the International Committee of  the Red Cross Mines-Arms 
Unit, discussed the legal aspects of  mine action in the midst of  internal conflict, relating in par-
ticular to the allocation of  responsibility for mine action in areas controlled by armed NSAs. (The 
views expressed were her own, and not necessarily those of  the International Committee of  the 
Red Cross.)
She argued that the positive and negative provisions of  the MBT bind all persons on the territory 
of  a State Party to the Treaty, be they government agents, members of  NSAs or lone individuals. It 
is the State’s responsibility to ensure that these obligations, which include carrying out mine action 
programmes, are met.
Yet how, in a situation of  an internal conflict, can a State be expected to fulfil its obligations on 
parts of  its territory that it does not control? Mrs Lawand’s answer was that a State bears a direct 
responsibility to implement its obligations, except in the case of  force majeure where conditions make 
it impossible for it to do so.
 
Thus, if  an NSA controls part of  its territory, a State can justify its failure to meet its mine ac-
tion obligations in that region, but only so long as that status quo exists, and only to the extent 
that the State makes “good faith” efforts to uphold the spirit of  the treaty in spite of  the situa-
tion. For instance, it must not deliberately prevent the implementation of  the MBT in areas of  
its territory that it does not control, must facilitate third party initiatives to carry out mine ac-
tion in those areas and, where possible, facilitate such efforts conducted by the NSAs themselves. 
To close, Mrs Lawand applied this legal theory to a number of  specific practical questions. 
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A Comment from a Mine Action Professional 
Mr Tim Carstairs, from the Mines Advisory Group (MAG, UK), expressed concern over the dan-
gers faced by humanitarian workers in times of  war. Focussing on the difficulties of  demining in 
particular, Mr Carstairs made a number of  important points concerning field operations. 
Firstly, he said that, within the context of  a conflict, some degree of  stability is needed to allow for 
demining, as well as an adequate guarantee of  the security of  the personnel involved.
Secondly, in order to create a humanitarian good, of  benefit to all actors and sectors of  the popula-
tion, it must be clear to the parties to the conflict that demining personnel, equipment and opera-
tions are untouchable. Thirdly, because of  the vagaries of  conflicts, it is particularly difficult to lead 
demining operations that require static work over extended periods, as well as repeated travel in the 
same areas. Before beginning such work, a demining organisation must consider the degree of  trust 
and confidence that it has in the parties to the conflict. Finally, there is the problem of  destroying 
informal mine stocks belonging to individuals not affiliated either to States or to NSAs. 
Mr Carstairs was also clear about the challenges to mine action that arise outside the war zone. In 
particular, he reflected that, owing to the ad hoc and dangerous nature of  such work, it is often dif-
ficult to obtain funding from international donors. Moreover, he suggested that, to mitigate some 
of  the dangers outlined above, it would be very useful for humanitarian deminers to benefit from 
the same legal, diplomatic or international protection for their operations as those granted to field 
operatives of  the International Committee of  the Red Cross.
Conclusions
Ambassador Jean Lint offered a synthesis of  the foregoing views. He called upon all actors, States 
or not, to spare no effort in tackling the problem of  anti-personnel mines and in meeting their 
responsibilities in favour of  a world forevermore without this weapon.
In the first of  two closing statements, Mrs Simona Beltrami, Coordinator of  the Italian Campaign to 
Ban Landmines and Co-chair of  the NSA Working Group, chose to emphasise the politicisation 
of  the landmine issue, and the way in which this obscures the human suffering caused by these 
weapons. The case studies presented, she said, clearly illustrated the need to create safe spaces for 
communities and individuals through the facilitation of  humanitarian mine action, even in the 
midst of  conflict.
The final speaker was Mr Pascal Bongard, Programme Director for Africa from Geneva Call. He was 
of  the view that mine action in conflict is possible. Of  course, he argued, there are many challenges 
and obstacles to such work. Indeed, there may be reluctance from the opposing parties to com-
mit to the mine ban, politicisation of  the issue and a lack of  cooperation in mine action. Equally, 
progress in peace negotiations often conditions progress in mine action and continued fighting and 
insecurity will inevitably hamper mine action efforts as will lack of  support by the international 
community, particularly donors. 
However, not every region in a war-torn country will be affected by the conflict, and in such cir-
cumstances, mine action may potentially be undertaken. Moreover, granting that not all mine ac-
tion pillars (demining for example) can take place, there is nevertheless room for whatever action 
is possible. In many cases, advocacy, Mine Risk Education and victim assistance can be undertaken. 
These initiatives are helpful not only because they reduce the mine threat, but also because they lay 
the ground for a comprehensive mine action effort once peace has been achieved.
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TIMETABLE: Mine Action In the Midst of Internal Conflict
Sunday 27 November 2005 - 1:30 to 5:30 pm
Zagreb
1:30 Conference Opening
● Welcome address: Mrs Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey, President of  Geneva Call 
and Mr Alvaro Jimenez, Coordinator of  the Colombian Campaign Against Land-
mines and Co-chair of  the International Campaign to Ban Landmines - Non-State 
Actors Working Group (ICBL-NSAWG)
● Opening statement: Ambassador Jean Lint, Director for Africa, Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs - Belgium, President of  the Fourth Meeting of  States Parties to 
the Ottawa Treaty (Moderator)
● Keynote address: Dr Dijana Plestina, Advisor to the Minister for Mine Action, 
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs - Croatia
2:00 Case Studies 
● Colombia: Mrs Diana Roa-Castro, Information Officer, Landmines and ERW 
Focal Point Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs OCHA, Colom-
bia, and Ms Sofia Reyes, Social Communicator of  humanitarian Spaces in South 
of  Bolívar - Peace Laboratory, Colombia
● Sudan: Mr Peter Moszynski, former Landmine Monitor Researcher 
● Sri Lanka: Mr Chandru Pararajasingham, Programme Coordinator, Tamils 
 Rehabilitation Organisation, Sri Lanka
● Questions and discussion
3:45 Discussion
● Legal aspects Mrs Kathleen Lawand, Legal Adviser to the International 
Committee of  the Red Cross, Mines-Arms unit
● Questions and discussion
● Exchange and discussion of  experiences and expertise with practitioners in 
humanitarian mine action 
 ● Questions and discussion
5:00 Conclusion
● Synthesis and recommendations, Ambassador Jean Lint
● Closing Statement: Mrs Simona Beltrami, Coordinator of  the Italian
 Campaign to Ban Landmines – Mr Pascal Bongard, Programme Director, 
 Geneva Call
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KEY DOCUMENTS AND SPEECHES FROM 
THE WORKSHOP
Opening Statements
Ambassador Jean Lint, Opening Statement
Since the foundation of  Geneva Call in 2001, I have had the pleasure to work together with its 
dynamic president, Madame Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey. The achievements in such a short time are 
impressive.
The Non-State Actors Working Group of  the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) 
and Geneva Call representatives attending the Third Meeting of  State Parties in Managua, Nica-
ragua, in September 2001, worked with the governments of  Colombia and the Philippines to suc-
cessfully introduce wording into the Managua Declaration affirming the need to engage NSAs.
During my presidency in 2002, I was in favour of  the concept of  having an informal meeting with 
non-State actors on the margins of  the Conference in Geneva, where important discussions were 
held on promoting adherence to the aims of  the Convention by armed, non-State actors and on 
how demining can be used as a confidence-building measure in peace-processes after internal and 
inter-State conflicts.
I certainly was glad that this helped to spur new language in the Final Declaration urging armed, 
non-State actors “to cease and renounce the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of  anti-per-
sonnel mines” as an increasing number of  conflicts were taking place within - rather than between 
- States.
For Sudan, the non-State actors were the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). 
Those non-State actors are today in the Sudanese Government of  National Unity, at the highest 
posts in the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs. No doubt that their involvement of  the past will be re-
flected in their will of  today to rid their country of  the problem of  anti-personnel landmines.
Another big achievement for Geneva Call was the fact that it was able to have eleven non-State ac-
tors of  Somalia talk together and agree to sign the Deed of  Commitment of  Geneva Call, making 
by that a remarkable confidence building measure. 
In my present function at the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, I am in charge of  the 48 African coun-
tries south of  Sahara. In that respect, I am happy to see that 47 out of  them are parties to the Con-
vention, with the exception of  Somalia. In that respect, I can tell you that last week, my minister of  
Foreign affairs met with the Prime Minister of  the Transitional Federal Government of  Somalia. 
During that meeting, the Prime Minister declared that once the government and Parliament are 
fully operational, accession to the Convention belongs to their priorities.
Burundi, which comes out of  a difficult period of  internal crisis and war, presents also the charac-
teristics that the non-State actors of  yesterday are now occupying major posts. The new President 
is coming from the CNDD-FDD, which signed the Deed of  Commitment of  Geneva Call two 
years ago. We can count on the engagement of  the government to do everything to finish the job 
of  mine clearance and stockpile destruction, without forgetting the necessary assistance to the 
victims.
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In conclusion, I call upon all actors, States or not, to spare no effort to tackle the problem of  anti-
personnel mines and take their responsibilities in favour of  a world definitively exempt of  this 
inhuman weapon.
Keynote address: Dr. Dijana Plestina
Dear colleagues, dear friends, 
First of  all, allow me to welcome you to Zagreb. It is wonderful seeing you here today. It is also both 
an honour and a pleasure to have the opportunity to speak on this important topic, as so many of  you 
here today have considerably more knowledge and have as well the field experience on this issue that 
I do not have. However, because the issue is such an important one, I have agreed to say a few words 
and I thank you for inviting me to do so.
When I first began working on the Mine Ban Treaty some six years ago, I remember thinking after 
some time (after attending a number of  intersessional meetings) that, while the Mine Ban Treaty is a 
very important instrument and an absolutely necessary one, it did not address one key problem area: 
that of  “freedom fighters”, “guerrilla groups” or “insurgents” as they are often called - or, as we call 
them - armed non-State actors (NSA). 
As a political scientist with considerable knowledge of  and experience in development, I was only too 
aware of  multi-level problems caused by land mines on the one hand, but also of  the problem associ-
ated with nation and State building in a post colonial world within a framework of  economic poverty 
and political dependency. What does it mean, I asked myself, to have a State sign and ratify the Mine 
Ban Treaty if  armed groups operating within that State continue to use anti-personnel landmines? 
What difference can it possibly make to the local population who placed the land mine? It was the 
question that was not broached at our States Parties Meetings, and yet, one which surely we could not 
ignore. For the problem existed – and therefore clearly it had to be dealt with. 
You can imagine how thrilled I was when I found out that there is a group of  people who, first of  
all, acknowledge that the problem exists and, second, are working towards finding a solution by talk-
ing with and encouraging dialogue between the dominant State and its non-State actors engaged in 
armed conflict. Thus, from the beginning, I have been a supporter and promoter of  Geneva Call and 
its work, as well as a fan of  its president Madame Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey. 
We all know that the very nature of  this process, engaging armed non-State actors in dialogue, is dif-
ficult and risky, and that success is anything but assured. I am sensitive to the sometimes slippery line 
that separates dialogue between parties in an armed conflict from recognition of  the legitimacy of  
armed groups, and the consequent hesitancy and/or even refusal of  some States parties to embark on 
the process. But, and I believe this firmly, there is no option to taking that difficult and risky road. 
For, if  the purpose of  our work is to eradicate all threat of  anti-personnel landmines, everywhere and 
for all time, - and, as signatories to the Convention we have all pledged that, that is our purpose - then 
it becomes our responsibility to work, both, with the armed non-State actors to comply with the pro-
visions of  the Convention, and, with the State Party in whose jurisdiction or control they operate. 
We all have the responsibility to work for the universal observance of  the Convention, and that 
means taking appropriate steps to first, persuade all armed non-State actors to stop the use, stock-
piling, production and transfer of  APM; second, to enlighten those armed non-State actors oper-
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ating in areas under States parties jurisdiction or control of  their requirement to comply with the 
provisions of  the Convention or be called to account for all violations; and third, to work with, or 
at least support, those who are working with the States within whose boundaries or control armed 
non-State groups operate to facilitate dialogue. 
A word of  caution: we must always remember that our task must be purely humanitarian. Though 
we may often feel that the humanitarian task requires a political solution in our work with the 
armed non-State actors, we can not and must not transgress on the sovereignty of  the State in 
whose jurisdiction or control the armed NSA operates. The responsibility and obligation to refrain 
from meddling in the internal affairs of  those States rests with each of  us if  we are to maintain 
credibility of  our work in universalization of  the Convention. 
 
It is only by working in cooperation with the State (party to the Convention or not), and only by 
using arguments as tools of  persuasion (no matter how slow, or frustrating that may be at times), 
that the credibility of  the process itself  and of  those working to include armed non-State actors in 
the process, will be ensured, and that our mutual goal of  universalization of  the Convention and 
of  a mine-free world can be achieved.




Ms Sofia Reyes 
MiCOAhuMADO: Building a humanitarian space
Micoahumado is a small village belonging to Morales town in southern Bolívar Department, 
Colombia. It is situated at the edge of  a mountainous region called “Serranía de San Lucas”. At the 
moment, Micoahumado and the nine small villages around it have 7000 (seven thousand) inhabit-
ants.
To reach the village, it’s necessary to cross the Magdalena River and then to cover 35 kms along a 
very difficult road. 
Micoahumado’s inhabitants live in precarious conditions, and its basic services, such as health care, 
education, drinking water, electricity, access roads, etc., are deficient. Ironically, this territory is full 
of  natural wealth and resources, has fertile land and is strategically placed in the region. This is why 
armed actors fight each other for its control.
Basic norms of  humanitarian respect have been broken in Micoahumado. The population has 
suffered blockading of  roads and restrictions of  food and medicines. Armed groups use spaces 
and houses belonging to civilians; who also suffer from frequent armed clashes around the small 
villages, as well as mined fields. Since 1998, fighting between the guerrilla and paramilitaries has 
become more intense. Twice, paramilitary groups have burnt the Farmers Association land, where 
beans and coffee are grown.
In December 2002, ELN guerrillas placed landmines in vital places of  the community: the aque-
duct of  the town, a soccer field near private houses, and the road that serves the nearby villages of  
La Plaza, El Reflejo, La Caoba and La Guásima.
To address this situation, the community itself  created a dialogue commission, composed of  farm-
ers, merchants, transport workers and teachers, with the support of  the Magangué diocese (Catho-
lic Church) and the Magdalena Medio Programme for Development and Peace (PDPMM Peace 
Laboratory). As a result, the armed groups moved further away from civilian houses, and the aque-
duct and the soccer field were demined - but not the road.
Amidst the critical situations, the crossfire, the fear and the stigmatization, people were accused 
of  belonging to one or another of  the warring factions, and yet they took the courageous deci-
sion to stay and not to let anyone displace them. For a month, the population took out white flags 
and stayed inside. And from this action was born the “Sovereign Communitarian Process for life, 
justice and peace of  Micoahumado”, with the community confirming its territory as a humanitar-
ian space, and creating the “Asamblea popular constituyente” which is a special form of  citizen’s 
participation.
At that time (December 2002) the situation was still difficult and the road was still mined.
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The only way possible for farmers to take out and sell their products was a footpath. Whether 
walking or riding a mule or horse, taking this path meant that farmers, women and children took 
far longer than they would usually have taken by road. The difference was terrible: four or even six 
hours’ on foot to reach Micoahumado market. Of  course this increased the price of  transport for 
every charge, affecting the domestic economy.
In these conditions of  humanitarian crisis, the creation of  the “Sovereign Communitarian Process 
for life, justice and peace of  Micoahumado” helped a lot to increase and strengthen the partici-
pation of  several institutions and Micoahumado won the support and the presence of  the Co-
lombian Campaign to Ban Landmines and Geneva Call. Other organizations worked to support 
and joined the Micoahumado Process: Redepaz, Organización femenina popular, Credhos, Corpo-
ración Nación, and government institutions, such as the Office of  the Ombudsman and the Social 
Solidarity Network. Finally, I must mention organizations with an international reach, such as PCS, 
Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT), the Office of  the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OhChR), the united Nations high Commissioner for Refugees (uNhCR), and the International 
Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC).
Together, those organizations, the Micoahumado community and PDPMM Peace Laboratory have 
developed the strategy of  protection and guarantees for the defence and respect of  the life of  
the community and civilian population. Developing this strategy through dialogue, Micoahumado’s 
citizens asked the ELN guerrilla to demine the territory. This proposal met with a positive response 
from the ELN and the insurgent organization agreed to demine with its own resources the La Plaza 
– El Reflejo – La Caoba – La Guásima road. This opened up the possibility for a key experiment 
in  humanitarian demining in southern Bolívar, Colombia.
Villagers forced to use a difficult path to avoid the mined road
Photo Credit: Colombian Campaign Against Landmines
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On 26th January 2005, the demined road was given to the community. On the same day, the popu-
lation and some institutions (as mentioned) held a symbolic celebration and made the following 
public announcement:
“We receive this road today, which we fully expect to contribute to peace and economic and 
social development, the respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law.
 
The Sovereign Communitarian Process for life, justice and peace of  Micoahumado asks 
the authorities for formal verification of  the demining to be carried out by an international 
organization capable of  this task. We also ask for this to be understood as a humanitarian 
demining, guaranteeing life and respect for the civilian population and the fulfilment of  the 
Ottawa Convention.”
Map given by the ELN
Celebration when the road was demined by the ELN
Photo Credit: Geneva Call
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This request by the Micoahumado community was expressed to the government on 15 January 
2005, and then by Geneva Call and the Colombian Campaign Against Mines, but there has not yet 
been any official verification in the field. It is very important for the community for action to be 
taken on this issue and for it to receive the support of  the authorities. This is the call of  Micoahu-
mado’s Process today.
The public communication along with a letter sent to highest authorities in Colombia expressed 
six specific requests:
1. To verify the demining.
2. To recognize Micoahumado’s community as a civil actor able to build peace.
3. To search for a political solution to Colombia’s armed conflict.
4. To support integrated development of  the region and to build a fair economy.
5. To improve the basic public services for the population.
6. To guarantee to keep the road as a territory of  peace, and of  course out of  the war.
Micoahumado’s experience should be seen as part of  the regional context. Similar processes have 
taken place, building humanitarian spaces in the whole Magdalena Medio region with Laboratory 
of  Peace (PDPMM). At the moment, there are 12 spaces and they work along 4 strategic lines:
1. Support and strengthen the population’s decision to declare their territory as a humanitarian 
space.
2. Conflict Identification and Description. 
3. Formulation of  a special plan of  guarantees and protection
4. Formulation of  an integrated proposal for development and peace (after guarantees for life, it 
is important for communities to find out how they want to live, to discover their vocation and 
to achieve the kind of  life we are talking about - a life with dignity).
For some actors it is difficult to understand the sense of  this “Sovereign Communitarian Proc-
ess for life, justice and peace of  Micoahumado” as an effort of  civilians, organized citizens who 
want guarantees that their lives will be respected and who want to stay in their territory. Leaders 
and communities are frequently marked, but they have decided to stay without serving any armed 
group, in the defence and respect of  life and the people’s dignity, showing a way for the rest of  the 
country: recovering dialogue and the spoken word as a strategy for conflict resolution. That is why 
they always say: “Love life and work for peace!” 
Mrs Diana Roa-Castro, Mine Action in the Midst of  Internal Conflict: 
The Colombian Case
Armed Conflict, History and Current Situation
Colombia, a country of  44 million inhabitants and a territory of  more than 1’000’000 km2, has 
been immersed in an internal armed conflict for the last 45 years. Of  eminently structural causes, 
associated with social inequality, poverty and the noticeable monopolies on land, resources and 
industry; the armed conflict has had diverse manifestations and involved a variety of  legal and non-
State actors with armed structures, clear hierarchies and ideologies. Armed groups in the service of  
economic interests and private armies under the command of  drug dealers have become another 
part of  the current picture.
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Although the first documented examples of  non-State armed groups in Colombia can be found 
back in the 1930s, it is possible to locate the genesis of  the current conflict in the 1940s and 50s, 
in the period known as “La Violencia”, marked by confrontations between the Liberal and Con-
servative parties, which led to some 300’000 deaths. This stage was followed by the formation of  
“self-defence” groups derived from the liberal guerrillas, whose initial objective was to protect 
themselves from government persecution of  farmers’ organizations, at that time promoted by the 
communist party.
In this context, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of  Colombia, known as FARC, emerged in the 
1960s as a guerrilla group, and became a more solid armed structure during the 1970s and 80s. The 
ELN (National Liberation Army) also emerged in the 1960s, growing out of  the radicalization of  
the Liberal Revolutionary Movement - MRL. These two groups constitute the main Non-State 
Armed Forces in the country, and have approximately 15’000 and 5’000 combatants respectively. 
FARC has an active presence in 31 of  the country’s 32 departments, on 62 battlefronts, whereas 
the ELN is active in 30 departments, concentrating itself  in the northern, eastern and the central-
western parts of  the country through 30 military fronts. At least another 10 leftist armed groups 
have a presence in the national territory. Among these are the EPL (Popular Liberation Army), 
the ERG (Revolutionary Guevarista Army) and the ERP (Revolutionary People’s Army). There 
is also a great presence of  paramilitary or self-defence groups, which are dispersed all throughout 
the territory. These groups, whose beginnings can be located in the 1970s, grew at the end of  the 
1980s to become “... powerful military structures able to carry out coordinated actions in all the 
country”. According to the Ministry of  National Defence, “... illegal self-defence groups have had 
a significant growth and the greatest territorial expansion in recent years...” At the moment, the 
great majority of  paramilitary or self-defence groups, under the umbrella organization Colombian 
United Auto-defences – AUC, are involved in peace negotiations with the national government. 
During the last 15 years, various peace processes have ended in the demobilization of  at least four 
armed groups. Among the most successful processes, it is possible to emphasize those that took 
place with armed groups like the M-19, the PRT (Workers Revolutionary Party), the CRS (Socialist 
Renovation Current), the EPL (Popular Liberation Army) and the Quintín Lame. Nevertheless, 
some others have failed and therefore darkened the humanitarian panorama of  the country. 
Between 1998 and 2001, FARC maintained dialogues with the government of  the former Presi-
dent of  the Republic, Andrés Pastrana Arango. These dialogues finished without any agreements. 
Also between 1998 and 2002, the National Government and the National Liberation Army - ELN 
maintained peace dialogues. Among the issues discussed were the respect for children’s rights and 
a limitation on the use of  antipersonnel mines. The process also ended without an agreement in 
June 2002.
As mentioned previously, the government of  President Alvaro Uribe Vélez maintains a peace proc-
ess with self-defence groups that began at the end of  2002. According to the Office of  the High 
Commissioner for Peace, 11’119 men pertaining to 20 groups have demobilized during the past 
1. The EPL, a leftist guerrilla that appeared during the 1960s, took part in the peace agreements signed between 1990 and 1994,. 
However, a faction of  this group is still active and maintains the name of  the original armed group. Francisco Caraballo, spokesman 
and former commander, is currently prisoner at the Maximum Security Prison of  Itagüí.
2. The ERG is a separate faction of  the ELN since 1993.
3. The ERP is a separate faction of  the ELN since 1996.
4. Colombia. Los paramilitares en Medellín: ¿desmovilización o legalización?, Amnesty International, London, United Kingdom, 
September 2005, page 5.
5. Los grupos ilegales de autodefensa en Colombia, Ministry of  Nacional Defense, Bogotá, Colombia, December 2000, 
page 5.
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three years. Until now, self-defence groups have handed over 7’298 weapons. No mines or ele-
ments for their manufacture have been recorded. 
It is important to highlight that the current government does not recognize the existence of  an 
internal armed conflict in the country. In different national and international forums, President 
Alvaro Uribe has defended the thesis that “... in Colombia there is a very serious social problem 
that we must solve, but the actions of  the violent groups cannot be framed nor defined as actions 
within an internal armed conflict. It is a terrorist threat against a State that is deepening the pluralist 
democracy. ” however, different humanitarian and human rights organizations, such as the Inter-
national Committee of  the Red Cross and the United Nations Office of  the High Commissioner 
for human Rights have stated that the conditions of  the armed confrontations and the impact on 
civilians mean that Colombia should be described as a nation with an internal armed conflict. They 
have also stated that the existence of  terrorist acts does not modify the legal description of  the 
conflict.
Today, between 1.8 and 2.6 million people are considered to be internally displaced. Nearly 5,000 
people have suffered injuries or have died due to landmines and other Explosive Remnants of  
War and between 7’000 and 14’000 children have been forcedly recruited by illegal armed groups0. 
These figures, together with the evident lack of  capacity of  the national government to develop 
efficient protection and attention measures to civilians at risk, are arguments enough to consider 
the Colombian situation to be critical and to consider it as an Internal Armed Conflict.
use of  Mines 
In the context of  the internal armed conflict, all the armed actors have used anti-personnel mines. 
The National Army, the Air Force and the National Navy declared that they have stopped using 
mines since 1999, although no moratorium has been issued. In 2001, with the entry into force of  
the Mine Ban Treaty, the Armed Forces officially ceased all use of  this type of  devices. At the mo-
ment, the Armed Forces continue to use Directed Directional Charges, which are not prohibited 
by the Treaty.
At least four groups of  armed non-State actors present in Colombian territory are still using mines 
and other Improvised Explosive Devises, making Colombia the only country in the Americas 
region where landmines are used in a continuous and systematic way. The Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of  Colombia - FARC, the National Liberation Army - ELN, the Revolutionary Guevarista 
Army - ERG and the umbrella paramilitary group United Self-defence of  Colombia - AUC have 
used mines in different areas of  the country, causing civilian victims. The increase and new out-
break of  hostilities between armed groups in recent years have caused a growth in the number of  
areas affected by mines, as well as the number of  civilian victims. This has also implied an increase 
in contamination by other Explosive Remnants of  War.
According to the Landmines Observatory, FARC is considered the major presumed perpetrator of  
both civilian and military mine accidents, followed by the ELN and the AUC.
6. The received weapons have been categorized as “Long weapons”, “short weapons” and “accompaniment weapons”. Nearly 5,000 
grenades have also been recorded.
7. President’s Uribe intervention during the Forum “Internal Conflict or Terrorist Threat?”, Chía, Colombia, 26April 2005.
8. Data provided by the Social Solidarity Network and the NGO “Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento”, 
October 2005.
9. Data provided by the Landmines Observatory from the Presidential Program for Human Rights and International Humanitarian 
Law, November 2005
10. Figures provided by UNICEF office in Colombia, June 2005.
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Types of  mines used in Colombia 
Although industrially manufactured mines have been used in the country, mostly developed by 
the Military Industry - INDUMIL and imported from the united States, former Czechoslovakia 
and Belgium; most of  the mines in Colombian territory are handmade, and manufactured with 
easily obtainable, home-made materials. It is frequent to find the use of  PVC tubes, plastic and 
aluminium fragments, mud and tin cans in the fabrication of  these artefacts. The explosive charges, 
included in variable amounts, are accessible through black markets and are mostly manufactured 
legally in countries of  the region, even Colombia. The handmade mines and improvised explosive 
devices - IED contain variable amounts of  shrapnel, made up of  metallic fragments, nails, sharp 
pieces of  glass and other elements. The Colombian Armed Forces have denounced the addition 
of  faecal matter, adhesive materials and other chemical ingredients in different classes of  home 
made mines and improvised explosive devises, thus generating greater complications to the already 
complex injuries caused by this type of  weapon.
The use of  handmade mines and IED generates complex challenges for the development of  hu-
manitarian mine action activities. The identification of  this kind of  device is complex, since they do 
not correspond to determined standardized patterns in appearance or industrial characteristics. In 
this sense, the activities of  Mine Risk Education are significantly difficult. The Mine Risk Educa-
tion organizations recognize this issue as one of  their main obstacles when trying to educate the 
people and communities at risk on the appearance of  mines. It is also important to consider that 
this kind of  mine can be manufactured in order to look inoffensive and sometimes useful objects, 
which may entice people into high-risk practices, such as tampering and manipulation. 
In terms of  victims’ assistance, the proliferation of  handmade mines and IED is also an important 
aspect to consider. The variability in the amount of  explosive which this type of  mine contains 
makes it impossible to determine its destructive power. Its shapes and appearances are also a matter 
of  risk, given that tampering or manipulating these objects is usual in areas where no knowledge 
about these issues has been imparted. However, according to medical staff  in areas of  high preva-
lence of  accidents, the major concern is the large quantity of  materials that are used for the manu-
facture of  these weapons, which disperse all throughout the residual limb and therefore lead to 
more amputations and secondary interventions. The use of  faecal matter and other toxic materials 
have generated injuries that go far beyond those seen in other kind of  war-related injuries.
But, without a doubt, the main challenges created by this type of  device are for mine clearance 
activities. The military forces have experienced great difficulties in carrying out such activities, since 
the metallic amounts and explosive material are highly variable, making it difficult and sometimes 
impossible to use traditional metal detectors. A similar situation arises with the identification of  
alternative mechanical means and animals. The risks taken by deminers increase, since their protec-
tive equipment is not designed for this weaponry and sometimes insufficient to protect them from 
the explosive force of  these mines.
11. INDUMIL, the Military Industry, depending from the Ministry of  National Defence and in charge of  the production of  weap-
onry in Colombia, manufactured an undetermined number of  antipersonnel mines under the references MAP-1 and MAP – 2. 
INDUMIL claims to have ceased the fabrication of  mines and to have destroyed the infrastructure for the production of  these 
weapons in 2001, after the entry into force of  the MBT
12. Landmine Monitor 2004: Toward a Mine Free World, Colombian Chapter, “Transference”, International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines, Washington D.C. United States, September 2004.
13. Information gathered through interviews with medical staff  of  Hospital Militar in Bogotá, Hospital San Vicente de Paul in 
Medellín, Hospital Ramón González Valencia in Bucaramanga, Hospital Universitario del Valle in Cali, and Hospital Manuel Elkin 
Patarroyo in Santa Rosa del Sur - Bolívar; Colombia. Information collected between 2003 and 2005.
14. Medical doctors of  Hospital Universitario del Valle and Hospital San Vicente de Paul have recorded a growing amount of  mine-
related wounds where there was presence of  animal faecal matter.
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Affected territory and mine victims
Between 600 and 660 municipalities are considered to be affected by the presence or suspicion of  
existence of  anti-personnel mines and other Explosive Remnants of  War. A minimum of  4’892 
victims have been recorded in 403 of  the 1’098 municipalities of  the country during the past 15 
years. Of  these, at least 3’438 (70.2%) were injured between 2000 and 2005, showing an increase 
in the annual and accumulated number of  recorded victims. According to the Landmine Monitor 
Report 2004, Colombia has the third most new victims of  any country in the world.
According to the National Landmines Observatory reports, between 2000 and 2004, 23% of  the 
victims of  mines died, while the other 77% were severely wounded or mutilated. Of  these, 61.8% 
were combatants and 38% civilians. Among civilians, children represent 30% of  the victims and 
women 10%.
Mine Action 
Mine action in Colombia is limited in scope and marked by a high degree of  centralism. In the last 
four years, since entry into force of  the Mine Ban Treaty, important changes at policy and coor-
dination levels have taken place, but progress in direct action in affected communities and victim 
assistance can be characterized as precarious in terms of  reach, coverage, impact and funding. Evi-
dently, the crisis generated by mines and ERW is growing faster than the national capacity to solve 
it and, in this sense, it is worth assessing mine action activities in the light of  its pillars.
universalization
Colombia has been a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty since 2001. The country is also party to 
the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its amended Protocol II, but it has not adhered to 
Protocol V. The Colombian Government has not issued a formal position regarding this Protocol, 
though there is a general consensus of  the importance that this instrument could have for the fu-
ture of  the country.
Colombia has adopted domestic legislation regarding mines. Law No. 759/03 deals with coordina-
tion issues, establishes a National Authority and introduces stiff  penalties for breaking the MBT. 
However, key elements of  the Law, such as the proposed humanitarian missions, have not yet been 
regulated, making this instrument inapplicable in some instances. The People’s Ombudsperson 
Office, as well as the ICRC, the Colombian Campaign Against Landmines and UN Agencies have 
called for the need for these regulations to be issued and signed by the President of  the Republic as 
soon as possible, in order to have more practical and effective tools to deal with the humanitarian 
crisis caused by mines and ERW in Colombia.
15. Statistics from the Antipersonnel Landmines Observatory for the Presidential Program for Human Rights and International 
humanitarian Law, at http://www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/minas and the Survey Action Centre Preliminary Opinion Collection, 
developed in Colombia in October 2005.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid. 
18. 0.7% of  these were recorded as non-State actors and 61.1% were from the Military Forces.
19. The International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC) delegation in Colombia, the Colombian Red Cross, the Colombian Cam-
paign Against Landmines, the People’s Ombudsperson Communications Office, The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
the UN Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the In-
ternational Organization for Migrations (OIM), as well as other national NGOs have made pronouncements in various forums 
regarding the importance of  having Colombia signing the CCW’s Protocol V, in the light of  the humanitarian imperative and as a 
confidence-building measure with the international community.
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It is also important to highlight the efforts regarding universalization of  the Mine Ban Treaty 
principles and spirit toward armed non-State actors that various groups have been making over 
recent years. Worth mentioning is the work that the Antioquia’s Humanitarian Commission has 
undertaken, as well as that done by other key actors, such as the Colombian Campaign Against 
Landmines. Nevertheless, the government ban on promoting or developing contacts with armed 
non-State actors in this or any other matter, and specifically regarding humanitarian activities0, 
poses significant obstacles to this kind of  work.
humanitarian Demining
There are no humanitarian demining activities taking place in Colombia. According to the Land-
mines Observatory, the internal armed conflict constitutes the main obstacle to initiating such ac-
tivities. Nevertheless, with the support of  the international community, the National Government 
has provided training and equipment for its military forces for mine clearance, which have been 
supported by the United States Government through the donation of  equipment and training. 
The Organization of  American States - O.A.S. also supports the National Army through training 
a group of  soldiers in standards and practical humanitarian mine-clearance activities. According 
to a recent Press Release by this organization, the O.A.S. and the national Government will initi-
ate mine-clearance operations in November 2005 in an area of  the department of  Bolívar, on the 
Colombian Atlantic Coast, called Mamonal. The O.A.S. will contribute with training, life insurance 
for the involved personnel, logistical support and international supervision for these activities. 
Regarding this announcement, the Colombian Campaign Against Mines issued a press release in 
which it stated that these activities cannot be described as humanitarian demining, given that their 
direct intention is not to handover the cleared land to affected communities. In the same press re-
lease, the Campaign stresses the need “to prioritise the needs of  the communities before commer-
cial ones, in issues related to mine-clearance”. There are no systematic mine-clearance activities 
and any that may take place do not conform to international standards nor correspond to priorities 
set by the affected communities. To date, the Landmines Observatory has received 35 requests to 
conduct humanitarian missions and mine-clearance operations in 16 departments and 34 sites of  
the country. Nevertheless, according to this institution, “it is impossible to prioritize and to give a 
proper response to all the requests that arrive... since these missions are not regulated, it is impos-
sible to give a response to these requests”. The Observatory considers eight of  these requests to 
have been solved while the other 27 remain pending.
On the other hand, “village demining” activities are more frequent every day. These tasks, carried 
out by people without training, suitable protection or supervision, have been witnessed in commu-
nities of  the departments of  Cauca, Santander and Vaupés, where groups of  natives and farmers 
have undertaken clearance operations either individually or in groups. In most cases, the commu-
20. See the document “Lineamientos para el enfoque de los proyectos de cooperación internacional”, High Commissioner for Peace 
Office, undated document, Bogotá, Colombia, 2005. 
21. The Landmines Observatory stated in the document “Evaluación de Necesidades en ERM”, that “One of  the mayor difficulties 
presented by all the experiences is the impossibility of  developing mine action in the context of  the armed conflict, as well as the 
proliferation of  handmade antipersonnel mines”, undated document, Bogotá, Colombia, page 13.
22. Interview with Luz Piedad Herrera, director of  the Landmines Observatory, Bogotá, Colombia, 15 November 2005.
23. OAS to Conduct Mine-Clearing Operations in Colombia, Press Communiqué E-261/05, 8 November 2005.
24. Ibid.
25. Communiqué No. 22, Colombian Campaign Against Landmines, 9 November 2005. 
26. Emergencies related to antipersonnel mines reported to the Landmines Observatory between January and October 2005, Land-
mines Observatory, undated document, sent by e-mail on 15 November 2005.
27. Interview with Luz Piedad Herrera, director of  the Landmines Observatory, Bogotá, Colombia, 15 November 2005.
28. Emergencies related to antipersonnel mines reported to the Landmines Observatory between January and October 2005, Land-
mines Observatory, undated document, sent by e-mail on 15 November 2005.
29. In different missions to communities, organizations such as UNICEF, OCHA, the European Union, the Landmines Observa-
tory and the Colombian Campaign Against Landmines have evidenced these kinds of  activities. 
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nities in which these initiatives have taken place have previously denounced the presence of  mines 
and other ERW to civilian and military authorities, with no practical answers. In other cases, like the 
one of  the indigenous community of  Northern Cauca, where the Indigenous Guard has decided to 
develop periodic inspections of  its territory and to remove mines and ERW, the motivation is not 
only to reduce the risk, especially to children, but also to avoid the entrance of  any armed group 
into their ancestral territory. According to indigenous leaders, “this can be dangerous, we know it, 
but it is more dangerous to leave those things there or to let the armed men use our territory. That 
will jeopardize our people’s position of  neutrality and autonomy regarding a conflict that does not 
belong to us”0. Regardless of  the causes, the truth is that village demining puts those who under-
take it at an enormous risk, which they decide to take due to the lack of  practical, efficient and 
neutral responses.
Victims Assistance
Colombia does not have a specific policy for mine victims’ assistance. According to the Landmines 
Observatory, attention to mine victims is developed under the same policies for victims of  violence 
and attention to people with disabilities and the Observatory has promoted this issue through the 
strengthening of  medical facilities and in the departments of  Valle del Cauca (hospital universi-
tario del Valle) and Santander (Hospital Ramón González Valencia). 
Victims’ Assistance continues to be one of  the most worrying issues regarding mine action. It 
is important to note that war related injuries, and specifically those caused by explosive devices, 
mines and other ERW are not considered as a public health problem. No variables related to this 
kind of  injuries are included in the Health Surveillance System and no data gathering mechanisms 
have been implemented at medical facilities at any level. In this sense, the loss of  key information 
regarding injury patterns, risk sites, risk behaviours and critical routes for the attention of  victims 
is continuous and irreparable. 
Also a matter of  deep concern is the lack of  knowledge regarding war wounds and their treatment 
at municipal level, as well as the lack of  basic first aid knowledge in affected communities. Even 
though the rate of  mine accidents grows everyday, no mechanisms have been designed or applied 
for affected communities to have a basic knowledge of  first aid attention and transportation of  
victims, and medical doctors at first level hospitals do not have the proper training and equipment 
to provide efficient care to the victims.
Mine Risk Education
It is commonly said that Mine Risk Education – MRE, is the only possible mine action activity 
under the present circumstances in the country. Though this has proven not to be the case, it is ac-
curate to say that this is the area in which most developments have been made, and in which most 
actors are currently working. According to the Landmines Observatory, MRE activities are being 
carried out by at least 12 organizations in 20 departments. Since the process of  National Stand-
ards for Mine Risk Education and the subsequent accreditation of  MRE organizations is under 
construction at the moment, the organizations which are mentioned in the Observatory’s inventory 
have diverse levels of  knowledge of  the issue, different constructions of  the Mine Risk Education 
concepts and very different capacities for carrying out such activities in the field. 
30. Interview with Nasa Indigenous leader, Caldono, Cauca, April 2004.
31. Interview with Luz Piedad Herrera, director of  the Landmines Observatory, Bogotá, Colombia, 15 November 2005.
32. Ibid.
33. Mine Risk Education map of  actors, Landmines Observatory, undated document, Bogotá, Colombia, April 2005.
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The development of  MRE plans, projects and activities in the context of  the armed conflict poses, 
among many other challenges, the fact that it cannot be exclusively linked to humanitarian demining 
activities. In this sense, it is impossible to think about MRE with the plain indicators of  accident 
reduction, or even to frame it in strict temporal schedules linked to mine-clearance operations. The 
most adequate definitions regarding change of  behaviour and the adoption of  safe and self-protec-
tive behaviour take a different perspective and all three components of  MRE (Education, Com-
munication and Community Liaison) become part of  an ambitious goal, which is to build social 
capital in communities worn out by years of  war. Mine Risk Education best practices in Colombia, 
show that MRE, and mine action as a whole, are tools to empower communities, and to provide 
them with knowledge and mechanisms, not only to protect themselves and their families, but also 
to enhance and strengthen their capacity to build humanitarian spaces.
Difficulties, Necessary Conditions and Successes 
•	Difficulties 
The continued use of  mines by non-State actors is the most evident, but also the most difficult 
obstacle to carrying out mine action activities in the country. The appearance of  new mine affected 
areas, as well as the changing characteristics of  affected communities and priorities, makes it very 
difficult to determine the real needs of  communities at risk and therefore to appropriately plan and 
carry out mine action activities. Directly linked to this aspect is the issue of  marking and fencing 
affected zones. The lack of  knowledge, will or capacity of  mine users to mark dangerous areas, has 
resulted not only in an increased number of  accidents but also in  the impossibility of  access to 
mined territories, which are mostly productive agricultural farms, generating important and long-
term socio-economic problems. The inexistence of  maps of  mined areas adds significantly to the 
difficulties at the time of  mine -clearance and other risk reduction methods. 
Armed conflict and the continuity and intensity of  hostilities are important factors too, given that 
this situation not only makes mine action difficult, but also increases the areas affected by ERW. 
It is considerably risky and very difficult to access many of  the mine affected areas, not only for 
practical and logistical issues, but also for security reasons. In February 2005, during a workshop 
on humanitarian Demining in Colombia, the Organization of  American States, as well as the 
Vice-President’s wife, acting as a Government delegate and permanent invitee of  the National 
Intersectorial Commission for Mine Action, established the will of  both the OAS and the National 
Government to carry out mine action activities, but highlighted the “impossibility of  starting any 
humanitarian demining in affected areas while there are ongoing combats in nearly all the terri-
tory” This situation, together with the negative government reaction to humanitarian spaces and 
agreements that could allow the development of  humanitarian mine action, increases the risk of  
vulnerable communities and survivors. 
Another important obstacle is the lack of  real knowledge on the actual impact of  mines and other 
ERW. Although the Information Management System for Mine Action - IMSMA, under the direc-
tion and analysis of  the Landmines Observatory, provides updated data on affected departments 
and municipalities as well as absolute cumulative frequencies of  mine/ERW victims, the present 
geo-referenced system based on the official national cartography, does not have the capacity to 
34. Statements by Ms Maria Victoria de Santos, Vice-president’s wife and permanent invitee to the National Intersectorial Commis-
sion for Mine Action – CINAMA and statement by Colonel William McDonough at the first forum for humanitarian demining, 
Cartagena, Colombia,22-24 February 2005
35. See the document “Lineamientos para el enfoque de los proyectos de cooperación internacional”, High Commisioner for Peace 
Office, undated document, Bogotá, Colombia, 2005. 
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register events at the level of  “corregimientos” and “veredas”36, therefore describing the risk areas 
as big polygons with no punctual definitions. On the other hand, no mechanism has been designed, 
adapted or implemented in order to evaluate the needs of  affected communities. In this sense, the 
“Preliminary Opinion Collection - POC”, a recent study developed by the Survey Action Centre 
- SAC in association with the Colombian Campaign Against Mines has been the only systemic 
exercise designed to understand the impact of  mines and ERW at a municipal level37. One of  the 
major conclusions of  this document is the need to evaluate the impact of  mines and other ERW 
at a community level, rather than at a municipal one38. A document developed by the Landmines 
Observatory in order to identify the affected municipalities with the highest priorities in terms of  
mine action, identified 64 municipalities where at least MRE activities should be started as soon as 
possible39. 
The subject of  reliable data and information is also a central aspect of  current difficulties in car-
rying out Mine Action activities. Today, basic IMSMA sources for this analysis are secondary ones, 
while the vast majority of  them are either military or intelligence based. This situation does not 
only apply a considerable weight to the military variables of  the data collection systems, therefore 
biasing the analysis; it also blurs the impact of  these weapons on civilians and their attention and 
protection needs. Currently, mine action experts and workers consider a significant under registra-
tion of  mine/ERW in Colombia as one of  the major information problems. In this same sense, 
the lack of  war related injuries variables in public health surveillance systems is an urgent need in 
order to identify a more accurate number of  mine/ERW affected sites and risky behaviours, as well 
as critical routes for the attention of  victims.
•	Necessary conditions 
The crisis generated by mines and other ERW has fundamentally humanitarian characteristics and 
impacts. In this sense, the humanitarian imperative as defined in the United Nations Mine Action 
Policy, regarding the principles of  humanity, neutrality and impartiality, must be devoted to the 
improvement of  human security conditions40. As obvious as it might sound, the main necessary 
condition for ensuring that mine action activities are humanitarian, possible and sustainable, is a 
proper recognition of  the humanitarian crisis that these weapons are causing, and the obligation to 
protect vulnerable civilians and affected communities. In this light, all  alternatives designed to miti-
gate the impact of  mines are to be considered, including, and sometimes privileging humanitarian 
dialogues and agreements in areas where armed non-State Actors have presence and/or control, 
in order to allow Mine Action Activities and even in some cases for them to carry out such activi-
ties. Humanitarian agreements and spaces are key instruments for a prompt start in the search of  
efficient solutions towards safer villages and individuals. 
Support from the international community is yet another determining factor for successful and 
sustainable mine action. This cooperation must be understood in the spheres of  funding, technical 
and political support, seeking maximum guarantees of  humanity, neutrality and impartiality, as well 
as effectiveness and efficiency of  its contributions. International cooperation should encourage 
capacity building at all levels and in a real participatory approach, where affected communities have 
36. The Preliminary Opinion Collection Document delivered by the Survey Action Centre in October 2005 translates the words 
“Corregimiento “as municipality, and “vereda” as community.
37. The POC translates the Word “municipio” (municipality) as district.
38. Preliminary Opinion Collection, Survey Action Centre and Colombian Campaign Against Landmines, Washington, October 
2005, page 16.
39. MRE Needs Assessment, Landmines Observatory, undated document, Bogotá, Colombia, May 2005
40. Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy, United Nations Inter-Agency Coordination 
Group on Mine Action, June 6 2005, page 10. 
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a main role to play, not as objects of  intervention, but as subjects of  positive changes and improve-
ments in their own living conditions. 
Of  no less importance is the need to obtain reliable information, systematized and analysed at 
all levels, where both data and its analysis flow effectively, in order to design policies, plans, pro-
grammes and projects. In this sense, the strengthening and decentralization of  data gathering and 
data analysis are urgently required. A public health based surveillance system also needs to be es-
tablished as soon as possible to help understand the real impact of  mine related injuries. 
Lastly, it is vital to understand that, even though Colombia’s situation is characterized by its com-
plexity and variety of  particularities, it must be framed in the global crisis generated by mines. Only 
by putting the Colombian situation in the context of  a worldwide problem, will it be possible to 
understand the real capacity to solve the problem in a sustainable and effective way. Therefore, 
the need to apply recognized impact assessment methodologies, adapted to the local context and 
taking into consideration the changing environment that the conflict creates, is not only necessary, 
but also urgent.
•	Successes 
Without doubt, the most important situation related to mine action that has taken place in the re-
cent history of  the country is the unilateral mine-clearance operation carried out by the National 
Liberation Army – ELN, at the beginning of  2005, covering 14 kilometres of  the road between 
the communities of  La Plaza, La Caoba and La Guásima, in the community of  Micoahumado, 
Morales municipality, in the department of  Bolívar. Because of  the processes that preceded the 
actual event, and the conditions of  where and how it took place, this can be considered as a very 
important humanitarian Mine Action activity. The events that preceded this act, such as the pre-
vious dialogues held between the ELN and members of  civil society, including the Colombian 
Campaign Against Mines and Geneva Call, were vitally important. But clearly, what made this 
process not only possible but also useful and successful, was the fact that an organized community 
was categorically asking for a fundamental right to be respected. The Micoahumado community 
understood not only their needs, but also their capacity and position, and managed to get armed, 
legal and non-State actors to respect and guarantee their fundamental rights. Once more, Michoa-
humado’s success belongs to the organized and empowered community, and owes special gratitude 
to those who made it possible. Nonetheless it is important to highlight that this is not a finished 
process, given that the territory that was cleared is only a small portion of  all the mine affected 
sites in this community. The aqueduct, the soccer field, some other sections of  road and various 
agricultural fields continue to constitute high risks for people in the community. Moreover, the lack 
of  expert reliable verification of  what the ELN cleared in January 2005 makes this exercise not a 
demonstrative (and some would argue, invalid) one in terms of  mine action.
In another region of  the country, in the department of  the Cauca, the Indigenous Guard of  
Jambaló has reached small temporary agreements with FARC, in order to obtain from them the 
clearance of  community areas after fighting had taken place in these zones. These agreements, 
although quieter and less supported given the complicated political situation of  this department, 
41. Letter sent by the ELN’s Central Command the Geneva Call and the Colombian Campaign Against Landmines, signed by Fran-
cisco Galán, commissioned by the ELN’s Central Command 4 January 2005.
42. Information provided during three interviews with Jambaló’s local leaders, whose names are not published for their identity and 
life protection.
43. With the highest concentration of  organized indigenous communities and one of  the most critical country areas in terms of  
hostilities and armed actors presence, the department of  Cauca turned in 2004 from the leadership of  Floro Tunubalá, the first 
democratically elected indigenous departmental Governor, to a traditional party. During the actual period, the Governor, Juan José 
Chaux, has signalized the Indigenous Movement to be “infiltrated” and a t times “collaborating” with FARC. Chaux has also pub-
licly minimized the indigenous communities problems and situation and compared them with other vulnerable communities, whose 
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are a significant landmark in the work of  social organizations in the mitigation of  humanitarian 
crisis and landmine/ERW impact. In this sense, it is important to emphasize the determination of  
the Indigenous Movement in Cauca to keep their ancestral territory as a mine free zone, framed in 
their Life Plans and community’s interests. The Movement has also managed to gain humanitarian 
access to carry out Mine Risk Education activities, allowing affected communities to participate in 
such activities and therefore to protect themselves. 
In another area, the inclusion of  the anti-personnel mines issue on the negotiating agendas with 
both FARC and ELN during the peace dialogues between the former National Government 
and the two groups should be seen as an important political success, which will have to be further 
developed. However, it is important to say that no mention has been made whatsoever of  the 
landmines issue during current negotiations with paramilitary or self-defence groups. While there 
is solid evidence that incriminates these groups in the use of  mines and an important group of  
demobilized persons are mine victims, this issue remained absent from the negotiations. Although 
no formal statement has been made in this regard by either the Government or the Self-defence 
negotiators, the high Commissioner for Peace told the Antioquia’s Departmental Government 
that “this issue (landmines) has not been included (in the negotiations), but we want to listen and 
attend to initiatives”. Meanwhile valuable information about affected areas and the possibility of  
re-creating reference maps is lost every day.
The recent establishment of  the Humanitarian Commission of  Antioquia, designed to promote 
humanitarian agreements with armed non-State actors regarding mine action, and specifically hu-
manitarian demining, as well as the inclusion of  the landmines crisis issue in pastoral dialogues are 
also important successes.
Finally, one of  the major successes of  these processes has been the confidence building effects they 
have had toward the national and international community. This has meant valuable support to the 
global cause of  having non-State actors respecting the Ottawa Conventional principles.
Politicization of  Mine Action 
The current context of  humanitarian action in Colombia has been significantly affected by the dec-
larations made by the national government in the last two years. Because of  its impact and potential 
application, it is important to highlight the document called, “Lineamientos para el Enfoque de los 
Proyectos de Cooperación Internacional” (Guidelines for International Cooperation Projects Ap-
proach) that was elaborated by the Office of  the High Commissioner for Peace and distributed in 
June 2005 by the Director of  the Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Coopera-
tion. According to this document, key aspects of  humanitarian activities, such as access to illegal 
armed actors for the establishment of  dialogue, can only be carried out by the President of  the 
Republic or his delegates. The obligation to clearly emphasize the scope of  all expressions con-
critical situations have neither been solved.
44. Agenda Común por el Cambio hacia una Nueva Colombia, Negotiation Agenda between FARC and Nacional Government, La 
Machaca, Caquetá, Colombia, 6 May 1999
45. Mainz Agreement, signed by Civil Society representatives and ELN, Mainz, Germany, 16 July1998.
46. Publicly but unofficially, several demobilized combatants from self-defense groups in Antioquia, Córdoba and Bolívar have ac-
cepted the use of  mines as a weapon of  war. The Landmines Observatory has also registered an undelivered number of  mine/ERW 
accidents where self-defence groups are the presumed perpetrators.
47. At the beginning of  the peace negotiations and the establishment of  the negotiation table in Santafé Ralito, Córdoba, various 
organizations such as the Colombian Campaign and UN organizations witnessed a “rehabilitation centre” establish by self-defence 
groups, where at least 30 men had been wounded by mines or other ERW.
48. ¿Desmovilización con Minas?, Press Article by Álvaro Jiménez Millán in Revista Semana, edition 1177, Online version, 19 
September 2004.
49. See the document “Lineamientos para el enfoque de los proyectos de cooperación internacional”, High Commisioner for Peace’s 
Office, undated document, Bogotá, Colombia, 2005.
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taining the term “humanitarian” as well as the express prohibition to include activities “... denomi-
nated “humanitarian”, implying contact with illegal armed groups...”0 also drew the humanitarian 
community’s attention and created a difficult environment for humanitarian organizations and 
activities. The government’s refusal to acknowledge the existence of  an internal conflict according 
to the norms of  International humanitarian Law generates serious problems at the time of  estab-
lishing dialogues and/or measures of  protection for civilians at risk. 
Of  a different, but also important, level of  complexity, have been the positions of  some armed 
non-State groups, who compare the discussions on the mine issue to those of  other issues like 
bombings, the use of  protected goods, etc. In this respect, the politicization of  mine action must 
be considered a permanent risk, exerted by all parties to the conflict, with still greater vehemence 
in issues related to limits for the war and limitations on the use of  certain weapons.
The vehement attitude of  the national government, asking all international cooperation for mine 
action to be centralized through government agencies, has generated concern among different ac-
tors, given the obvious disregard for humanitarian organizations and activities outside the govern-
ment’s interests and priorities. 
Role of  the State 
The State has shown a diversity of  capacities in the various institutions that carry out activities or 
hold responsibilities regarding mine action. Legally, the national measures of  application of  the 
Mine Ban Treaty remain weak, since they have failed to establish clear responsibilities in the differ-
ent governmental organizations at central, departmental and municipal level. Also, the monitoring 
bodies lack the specific tools necessary to develop their monitoring functions. But the most trou-
bling situation in this aspect is the lack of  regulation of  certain vital measures for mine action such 
as the humanitarian missions, provided for in Law No. 759/03. To date, concrete information does 
not exist on the legal course of  the regulation of  these missions, which are considered of  great 
importance by major humanitarian actors.
In relation to non-State actors and landmines, until 2003, Colombia maintained a progressive posi-
tion, consistent with International humanitarian Law, in which groups were called upon to agree to 
and respect the principles of  the Ottawa Convention, and the international community was asked 
to participate in this effort. The change in policy of  Colombia’s delegation to the Nairobi Summit 
calls the attention of  the mine action community, given the political and humanitarian distance 
with the previous position. Also worrisome is the position of  the Government toward the peace 
process with paramilitary groups, as has already been mentioned. 
50. Ibid.
51. The document “Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática” which constitutes the governmental policy for the national 
defense,makes no mention to the internal armed conflict. In contrast, the term “terrorism” is mentioned more than 60 times in 68 
pages.
52. In an interview given in 2003 by the ELN to a journalist of  El Colombiano, a local newspaper, two of  this group’s commanders 
said that “There could be agreements: that the Army and the paramilitaries stop bombing in an indiscriminate way and we won’t 
use mines“ In June 2004, in the framework of  the International Forum on Antipersonnel Mines and Humanitarian Agreements, 
the ELN’s Central Command said that “The ELN proposes to work for a Humanitarian Agreement that beyond agreeing with the 
Colombian Government about the limitation on the use of  mines an UXO, we could reach a general Amnesty for Political Prisoners 
and war prisoners and a bilateral ceasefire…” 
53. In different opportunities and in a public way, organisms such as the People’s Ombudsperson’s Office and the ICRC have 
highlighted the importance of  this instrument. They have categorically asked for this missions to be regulated so that they could be 
implemented as soon as possible.
54. See the Colombian delegation speeches during the Mine Ban Treaty Meetings in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 and the press com-
muniqué “Censura Política y Penal contra FARC, ELN y AUC por uso de Minas”, Sistema de Noticias del Estado, Nairobi, Kenya, 
2 December 2004.
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As stated previously, the role of  the present government in relation to the progress made with the 
ELN over recent years has been absent and quiet, attached to the national policy of  Democratic 
Security. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that there have been no direct attacks or sanc-
tions to this initiative and this could be interpreted as a signal of  approval. 
Some other sectors of  the State have played an important role in the successes achieved so far and 
their role will have to be taken seriously in order to continue advancing along these paths. Social 
and non-governmental organizations have led a great majority of  the practical mine action initia-
tives. They have also accompanied and participated in the development of  national policies in this 
regard. 
The Role of  Armed Non-State Actors
It is important to emphasize some clear responsibilities of  armed actors towards International hu-
manitarian Law. Although the first and ultimate responsibility must be stopping the use of  mines, 
this has to be acknowledged as a complex commitment that will require common efforts. In the 
meantime, aspects such as the proper and suitable marking and fencing of  dangerous areas, as well 
as notification to the communities, must be an immediate imperative. Demands to obtain humani-
tarian spaces in order to carry out mine action activities, in particular mine clearance at sites of  spe-
cial interest, such as schools, roads, aqueducts; mine risk education activities, timely and adequate 
transportation and care of  those wounded by mines, must be categorical and urgent. 
 
In the practical scene, the progressive and crucial role of  the ELN in dealing with mine action and 
other mine related issues has to be highlighted. Without ignoring their responsibility in hundreds 
and maybe thousands of  the mine accidents in the country, it should be acknowledged that this 
group has developed a political position, has started punctual actions and has established clear 
patterns in the road to mine eradication. Evidently, the support of  humanitarian, social and non-
governmental organisations as well as some government institutions (both in the past and present) 
for these initiatives has served to deepen the dialogues and to advance in the way towards the profit 
of  humanitarian commitments against mines.
FARC has had a more passive attitude, although it is important to recognize the explicit mention to 
landmines in its agenda of  negotiation in 1999. As mentioned before, this group has made small, 
quiet agreements with the Indigenous Community of  Cauca, not only clearing some spots where 
ERW remained after fighting in traditional sacred territories, but also allowing communities access 
to Mine Risk Education activities. 
Finally, it is important to make a forceful call to self-defence or paramilitary groups, in order to 
obtain from their part, not only marking of  affected areas, but also humanitarian access to MRE 
activities and attention to the victims. Of  the utmost importance is that their former combatants in 
the process of  demobilization deliver all the available information on areas mined by them, within 
the framework of  the present process of  negotiation. The opportunity offered by the extension in 
the timetable for these groups’ demobilization must be taken as a golden one to correct the mistake 
made by forgetting to introduce the issue in the negotiation agreements.
Special agreements 
No formal agreements have been made with non-State actors regarding mine action. However, the 
55. Some analysts have seen the governmental permissions waived to ELN commander Francisco Galán, as clear but tacit approval 
for this group to continue in their path of  commitment toward mine action. 
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punctual experiences mentioned above constitute a solid foundation for those to come. The work 
carried out by social organizations, including national and international NGOs and the ELN, al-
though devoid of  legal mechanisms or verification of  its fulfilment, must be considered an impor-
tant basis for future work. The statements made by the ELN over the last two years have opened up 
spaces to discuss the possibility of  these agreements becoming more formal. In relation to FARC, 
no publicly known approaches have been made as yet. The same is true with regard to self-defence 
groups.
The Role of  States and the international Community 
The participation of  other governments in this sense has been sporadic and intermittent. In addi-
tion to the declaration of  the European Parliament, encouraging the Colombian Government to 
convene Non-State armed actors to fulfil the Ottawa principles and to allow mine action activities 
regarding these actors, the work of  international organizations such as Geneva Call has been a key 
issue to understand the extent of  the role these groups have to play in order to eliminate the risks 
posed by mines and ERW. It is worth saying that this organization has accompanied and supported 
special efforts made by national NGOs and civil society, giving them a sense of  international rec-
ognition. 
Other effects
Without a doubt, the most important effect of  these approaches and possible agreements with 
non-State actors, has been the confidence building. A detailed analysis of  the interventions and ac-
tions developed in the work with the ELN, shows progress in the treatment of  these aspects, which 
opens the door to new subjects of  the same tenor. It is clear that the process has been carried out 
in a responsible way, therefore contributing to the possibility of  its expansion. One clear sign of  
this is the establishment of  the humanitarian Commission of  Antioquia, which has been endorsed 
by ample sectors in the country. Equally important has been the visibility that these efforts have 
obtained, positioning the subject of  mine action as one of  the most urgent humanitarian needs in 
Colombia. 
Conclusions and lessons learned
 
The main inspiration and basis for this type of  activity must always be the humanitarian imperative, 
framed in the principles of  humanity, impartiality and neutrality as grounds for Mine Action. Only 
having in mind the real needs and the evident risks that the affected communities take everyday, 
will it be possible to surpass the tactical and political barriers that today prevent the development 
of  humanitarian agreements regarding mine action.
The participation of  the affected communities in all the processes of  dialogue and negotiation for 
the establishment of  humanitarian agreements is key to ensuring not only the real satisfaction of  
their needs, but their legitimacy, sustainability and pertinence. This type of  exercise not only pro-
vides the possibility for building humanitarian spaces and reaching agreements with armed actors, 
but strengthens the social capital of  vulnerable communities under constant threat. 
The endorsement and the participation of  social and non-governmental organizations in the con-
struction of  these common efforts toward the eradication of  mines and their impact is one of  the 
major elements to guarantee the suitable development of  these activities. The role of  civil society 
has proven to be fundamental for the benefit of  humanitarian objectives and humanitarian mine 
action. Nevertheless, this situation cannot underestimate nor supplant the State or the communities 
themselves, which must be empowered and supported at all times. But to give real possibilities to 
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these initiatives, it is necessary to count on the determined support of  the highest levels of  soci-
ety and government. Equally necessary is the support of  the international community in political, 
technical and financial matters. 
Finally, the main lesson of  this ongoing process, and also its main conclusion, is that, contrary to 
the beliefs of  many national and international sectors, it is possible to have Humanitarian Mine Ac-
tion in the midst of  conflict. It is not to be forgotten that armed groups of  any nature or tenor are 
made up of  the same human mass: men and women who are part of  some community, who have 
families, fears, and hopes. It is with them that agreements are made, on the basis of  confidence 
and faith in human kind. However sophisticated wars may be, they are always mediated by human 
beings able to reason in the light of  the humanitarian need. Mines, as one of  the most atrocious 
weapons of  war, are on the way to becoming extinct, but without the commitment of  those who 
are still using them, it will not be possible to fulfil the humanitarian principles that gave life to Ot-
tawa and that keep it alive and effective today.
Sudan
Mr Peter Moszynski, Mine Action in the Midst of  Internal Conflict: 
The case of  Sudan
As Sudan moves towards implementation of  a fragile peace deal signed last January, it has be-
come one of  the major priorities for the international mine action community. As Sudan is some-
thing of  a test case for mine action during conflict it is perhaps worth examining this complicated 
case history in more detail. 
Background to the Conflicts 
Sudan has seen very little peace in its 50 years since independence. An Anglo-Egyptian “Condo-
minium” until 1 January 1956, Africa’s largest country is also one of  its most diverse: geographically, 
culturally, linguistically, and so on. The north of  the country has long been under Arab and Moslem 
influence but the South was cut off  until the mid-nineteenth century due to the impassable barrier to 
Nile river traffic presented by the Sudd swamps. The subsequent history of  slave raiding and Islamic 
expansion (until finally curtailed by a British invasion in 1898) has left lasting distrust towards Khar-
toum’s rule by almost all the African people of  the South - a distrust shared by many people on the 
periphery of  this vast country. 
Although North-South divisions have led to decades of  war, this is not the country’s only tension. 
Many people in the west (Darfur) the east (adjacent to the Red Sea), the far north, the south-east 
(Blue Nile) and the centre (Nuba Mountains and Abyei) also have long-standing grievances with the 
central government that have caused further conflicts between the ruling elites and those who regard 
themselves as the “marginalised majority”.
War broke out between North and South in 1955 due to a decision to make Sudan a unitary State 
after decolonisation. The conflict ended with a peace deal signed in Addis Ababa in 1972, granting the 
South regional autonomy. In May 1983 the war restarted following President Numeiri’s decision to 
repudiate the 1972 agreement. What began as a localised military rebellion became all out war follow-
ing Numeiri’s imposition of  Islamic Sharia law throughout the country. The Sudan People’s Libera-
tion Army (SPLA) was originally formed by defecting Southern army units but the insurrection soon 
spread to areas outside of  the south, particularly the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, where there was 
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strong resentment against the perceived Arabisation and Islamicisation plans of  central government.
The SPLA gradually won control of  most of  the South and large enclaves in the north, which al-
lowed its leadership to claim that it was fighting for the entire country - a “New Sudan” - rather 
than just for the South, although this was not widely supported by southern fighters and civilians 
who thought that the struggle was for independence. As talks began to end the civil war in the 
South, low intensity conflicts in Darfur and the east flared up into full-scale warfare, largely due to 
their exclusion from the peace process, leading to widespread ethnic cleansing, a situation that has 
yet to be rectified.
22 years of  conflict has left Sudan as one of  the most poverty-stricken and mine affected coun-
tries in the world, with millions of  people dependent on outside food aid provided since 1989 by 
Operation Lifeline Sudan, one of  the largest relief  operations in history. The presence of  huge 
reserves of  petroleum in the South has heightened outside interest - as well as making the prospect 
of  Southern independence increasingly unattractive to Khartoum. 
Landmine threat
Sudan still has mines dating back to the Second World War, particularly along its northern borders. 
There was some limited mine use in the 55-72 civil war, mostly in the far south, and fairly extensive 
mine use during the 83-05 conflict. Whilst the SPLA controlled much of  the hinterland, Khar-
toum’s army was mostly based in garrison towns, leaving much of  the actual fighting to various 
militias and proxy forces, which in turn led to widespread inter-clan and inter-tribal violence that 
fluctuated as temporary alliances, peace deals and inter-factional fighting ebbed and flowed. Thus 
there have been few permanent front lines in the conflict, other than around besieged government 
garrisons, so mine use has been both widespread and sporadic. 
The existing mine threat is largely in the South and in the east, south east and the Nuba Mountains 
in the centre, the areas where most of  the fighting between Government of  Sudan (GoS) and SPLA 
took place and mostly now under SPLM control. There are few organised minefields and mines 
have not been laid following specific patterns. Areas such as bridges or water wells are frequently 
contaminated. A large amount of  Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) is found near populated areas, on 
the edges of  roads and around abandoned camps and garrisons. Many villages have ammunition 
supplies that they are often reluctant to surrender until they are confident of  the peace process. 
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Many roads were blocked by mines, which led to restricted access by aid agencies and an increase 
in the cost of  food and other items. The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that mines 
directly affect two million people’s food security. Landmines and UXO are also a serious obstacle 
for reconstruction projects. The country’s huge size and severely limited infrastructure as well as its 
extreme climate create additional problems for humanitarian mine action (HMA).
GoS forces appear to have ringed most of  their garrisons and outposts with randomly laid anti-per-
sonnel mines, whilst the SPLA frequently used anti-tank (AT) mines to cut roads and ambush con-
voys. Both sides appear to have had substantial stocks of  both types at various times, although the 
SPLA - being largely a guerrilla force - was generally more involved in a war of  movement which 
both hindered its logistics and lessened its reliance on fixed defensive positions. The areas where 
there were fixed lines of  confrontation are clearly the most heavily affected, although widespread 
“nuisance mining” has left many areas suspected of  being contaminated. 
Mine Ban Policy
After participating in the Ottawa Process, Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, 
which was ratified on 13 October 2003 and entered into force for the government on 1 April 2004. 
The SPLM had declared a unilateral moratorium on the use of  AP mines in 1996, although this was 
not widely disseminated in the field until later.
By 1998 there was growing tension between those within the SPLM who wanted to reduce the 
mine threat to civilians in the huge areas now under their control and most international organisa-
tions who felt that humanitarian mine action wasn’t really possible in situations of  ongoing con-
flict. The SPLM had created Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL) as an indigenous mine action 
organisation in 1997, and began to develop a cadre of  trained humanitarian deminers, with limited 
international donor and technical support, but was unable to secure sufficient funding to make 
much impact outside a few small border areas. As an NSA, it found it difficult to obtain much in-
ternational recognition, especially in the wake of  a 1997 UN mission that concluded that it was not 
feasible to conduct HMA during Sudan’s ongoing conflict. It also had virtually no contact with the 
Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines and other organisations working on the government side.
Deminers of  OSIL - Photo Credit: Peter Moszynski
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The SPLM began to seek greater international involvement in addressing the massive mine prob-
lem. In March 2000, OSIL and the SPLM took part in a landmark meeting in Geneva organised 
by the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines in association with the Colombian, Philippine and Zim-
babwean Campaigns to Ban Landmines, the UK Working Group on Landmines (subsequently 
reconstituted as Landmine Action UK) and Mines Action Canada. Entitled “Engaging Non-State 
Actors in a Landmine Ban”, this pioneering conference paved the way in achieving recognition of  
the role that NSAs had to play in the universalisation of  the Mine Ban Treaty. 
The SPLM signed the Geneva Call “Deed of  Commitment” on 4 October 2001 in Geneva. Speak-
ing for the SPLM, Nhial Deng asked: “Do we have to wait for a political peace to be declared after 
which to move to save innocent lives? If  it has been possible for the international community to 
save millions of  innocent lives from famine and diseases for the past eleven years during conflict, 
what then would be the logic of  vaccinating a child against polio for it to be maimed or killed a day 
or moments after by a mine?” 
Whilst the motives were nominally humanitarian, there was also a desire to obtain funding to allow 
the movement to restore order in areas it now controlled. Deng explained: “The SPLM/A is fully 
conscious of  the fact that although it is a non-State actor, the world has come to expect from it hu-
manitarian standards, approaching if  not on a par with those expected of  sovereign governments. 
This constitutes a daunting challenge and a tremendous burden for our Movement, and unless the 
international community comes to our aid with increased levels of  humanitarian assistance, espe-
cially in the field of  health, education and human resources development, we will not be able to 
continue to live up to those high expectations.”
International attitudes towards mine action in Sudan began to change due to the increasing interna-
tional profile of  the SPLM and its involvement in the mine ban process, through Geneva Call and 
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) NSA working group, which led to greater 
contacts in the outside would and support for HMA. In September 2003, Geneva Call, SPLM/A 
and OSIL held a workshop in New Site, South Sudan, with funding provided by the European 
Commission. Participants included SPLM/A leader Dr. John Garang de Mabior, political leaders, 
commanders and soldiers, local civil authorities and mine action agencies. This year the SPLM 
started regional mine ban education workshops in South Sudan, in collaboration with Geneva Call 
and the Kenyan Coalition Against Landmines. The first took place in Rumbek from 27 to 29 July 
2005. Opened by Governor Pagan Amum it brought together SPLA commanders, civil authority 
and community leaders, UN agencies, mine action NGOs, Landmine Monitor and, for the first 
time, the northern-based Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines. A second workshop was expected 
to take place immediately after in Equatoria region, but was cancelled due to the tragic death of  
Dr John Garang. 
Mine Action
hMA in Sudan can be divided into four phases:
1) Indigenous mine action 1997-2002
2) Mine action in Nuba Ceasefire 2002-2004
3) Internationalisation of  mine action following north-south ceasefire 2004-2005
4) Post CPA Jan-Aug 2005 onwards 
Mine Action prior to 2002
Established in 1997, Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL) was the SPLM de facto authority for 
landmine issues. OSIL disputed the UN finding that HMA was not possible during conflict and 
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began clearance in SPLA-controlled areas. However, OSIL’s effectiveness was constantly limited by 
insufficient funding and non-existent infrastructure, and although help from groups like Mines Ad-
visory Group (MAG) and CAMEO allowed it to train a basic cadre of  humanitarian deminers who 
made valiant efforts to clear certain areas, it was not entirely geared up to international standards. 
Between September 1997 and April 2003 OSIL says it cleared 10.5 million square meters, destroy-
ing 3’512 antipersonnel landmines, 732 antitank mines and 116’930 UXO. 
A rival local group later appeared, the Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service (SIMAS), and togeth-
er they formed a core for future demining efforts on the SPLM side. There was basically no HMA 
conducted on the GoS side. Given the huge problem faced in such a huge area, the under-funded 
local initiatives made little headway before the involvement of  the international players in the wake 
of  the peace process. 
As peace talks progressed the united Nations Mine Action Service (uNMAS) became involved 
and began to develop a planning strategy for post-conflict mine action - loosely based on a “one-
country” approach. The UN system has always found it difficult to deal with NSAs and only has 
formal relations with the government of  the country, so diplomacy always required a notional one-
country approach, whatever the situation on the ground where there were - and still are - effectively 
two separate administrations. 
A series of  meetings with Sudan CBL, OSIL and others resulted in the involvement of  Britain’s 
Landmine Action UK in another “Crossline” project, the Sudan Landmine Information Response 
Initiative (SLIRI) which planned to conduct survey work with SIMAS and other local partners on 
both sides of  the divide.
The second phase of  mine action: The Burgenstock Nuba Ceasefire agreement
Despite the work of  international civil society in attempting to bridge Sudan’s North-South divi-
sions, the first involvement of  both sides in mine action came from an unexpected development: 
the Bürgenstock ceasefire for the Nuba Mountains agreed in January 2002. Existing plans for 
North-South participation in Crossline mine action were hastily adapted to take advantage of  this 
regional truce, which saw a military stand down in the Nuba area whilst hostilities increased in the 
rest of  the country. The Nuba enclave had previously been off-limits to relief  from Operation 
Lifeline Sudan, because it was technically in North, rather than South Sudan. It had been virtually 
cut off  from the outside world since 1992 and the ceasefire finally permitted outside aid to reach 
the population.
The UN Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) pointed out the opportu-
nities presented by the Burgenstock agreement, as well as the need for mine action to effectively 
monitor and implement the ceasefire: “Whilst Sudan has been torn by civil war for many years, an 
internationally monitored cease-fire agreement has been in place in the Nuba Mountains since Jan-
uary 2002 and this has resulted in increased opportunities for direct mine clearance intervention. 
Any wider cease-fire agreement achieved at the internationally supported peace talks at Machakos/
Kenya will also result in further opportunities for direct mine clearance intervention.” Landmine 
threat throughout the Nuba Mountains, OCHA 19/11/2002 
Landmines had “a significant negative effect on the mobility of  the international monitoring force, 
the Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) and hence their ability to properly monitor and give cred-
ibility to the cease-fire. It is also a threat to the free movement of  the population and hindrance to 
NGO/Agency humanitarian intervention.” Many areas had “become isolated and paralysed due to 
the presence of  landmines along access routes/roads and denying access to basic facilities... The 
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delivery of  humanitarian aid is similarly restricted with the bulk continuing to be delivered by air, 
at increasing financial and time-consuming cost. The expected increase in population movement, 
particularly IDPs, will additionally overburden this situation and place new and more vulnerable 
people, including humanitarian aid staff, at greater risk.”
hMA in the Nuba Mountains saw demining teams from both sides coming together for training in 
a neutral area of  no-man’s-land after the local ceasefire was established, although they were subse-
quently segregated when they began actual work. DanChurch Aid trained teams from JASMAR on 
the GoS side and OSIL on the SPLM side. The lack of  a regional peace deal to go with the ceasefire 
on the ground rather precluded the widespread confidence required for true crossline activity and 
in practice there were two separate operations on either side of  the military divide. A somewhat 
parallel framework was created by SLIRI and LMA-UK, which also took advantage of  the Burgen-
stock agreement to apply its own plans for Crossline activities within the space presented by the 
local ceasefire. 
There are several factors which differentiate the Nuba Mountains from the rest of  Sudan. Although 
the area was largely controlled by the SPLM, the people are not southerners and the CPA does not 
grant them the same rights as people in the South. Many Nuba fear for their future if  the southern 
part of  the country decides to opt for independence in a referendum planned for 2011. However, 
there was almost no Nuba representation at the peace talks and none in the initial negotiations for 
HMA. Concentration on the Nuba enclave rather diverted attention from the South during this 
period, leading to a virtual standstill in indigenous hMA in the area, although the experience of  
working in the Nuba Mountains gave international actors a better understanding of  the problems 
facing future activities once the peace process addressed the country’s main conflict.
Towards Nationwide HMA
In September 2002, a National Mine Action Office (NMAO) was established in Khartoum, with 
assistance from UNMAS. A regional mine action office was set up in Kadugli in the Nuba Moun-
tains. In February 2003, SPLM and UNMAS established a Southern Sudan Mine Action Coordina-
tion Office in Rumbek. UNMAS later reported: “The slow pace of  peace negotiations has affected 
the pace of  information gathering. There has been little coordination between the national NMAO 
in Khartoum and the sub-offices in Rumbek and Kadugli.” 
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In mid-2003 a general ceasefire was agreed to create a conducive atmosphere for the stalled peace 
talks. In August agreement was reached on a national strategy for HMA, envisaging that Sudan 
would remain a conflict situation until a comprehensive peace agreement was fully implemented. 
UNMAS stated: “The ongoing civil war in Sudan currently precludes the implementation of  a con-
ventional centralised Mine Action programme; this situation is likely to remain during the Interim 
Period of  any Ceasefire/Peace Settlement resulting from the current Machakos Peace Talks. It is 
therefore the intention of  the UN Emergency Mine Action Programme in Sudan to work within 
the confines of  this conflict situation and wherever possible develop cross-conflict, peace building 
initiatives, that will demonstrate a tangible peace dividend to all communities and help to build trust 
and confidence between the two separate authorities.” 
HMA in the South restarted early in 2004, with a number of  new international actors coming in un-
der UN auspices following the agreement of  the general ceasefire. Mechem and FSD were involved 
in the emergency road construction plan drawn up by WFP, while other groups such as MAG, NPA 
and SLIRI began surveying, training local deminers, UXO disposal and spot clearance tasks. As in 
the Nuba enclave, most of  the schemes were nominally “crossline” but in practice included sepa-
rate components working on GoS and SPLA sides. However, there was very little contact between 
the two sides on the ground prior to the CPA being implemented, which severely restricted coop-
eration. Teams on both sides faced constant delays, threats and harassment from local troops and 
authorities when beginning the priority demining task, opening of  the main transport corridors.
The Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), under the auspices of  the Ministry of  Humanitarian 
Affairs, became Khartoum’s focal point for mine action coordination. The Sudan Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (Sudan CBL) was the civil society network responsible for the coordination of  mine 
action in government-controlled areas of  Sudan. There were 33 national and international NGOs 
in the Sudan CBL as of  March 2004. The Sudan CBL convened a workshop in Khartoum in De-
cember 2003 to address planning for the post-peace period. Participants included officials from 
HAC, the Army, UN and NMAO. On 9 May 2004, the SPLM passed a decree creating the New 
Sudan Authority on Landmines (NSAL) and the New Sudan Mine Action Directorate (NSMAD), 
with OSIL losing its previous coordinating role.
In August 2004, UNDP and UNMAS held meetings to formulate a “Mine Action Strategic Frame-
work for Sudan.” Participants included representatives from the National Mine Action Authority, 
National Mine Action Office, the Southern Sudan Mine Action Authority, Southern Sudan Mine 
Action Directorate, Sudanese civil society, international and local NGOs, international institutions, 
UN agencies and international donors. UNMAS stated, “The rapidly changing political environ-
ment and developments within the mine action programme have overtaken the original strategy 
and it is recommended that it is revised as a matter of  urgency. This will also facilitate the formula-
tion of  feasible project proposals linked to a realistic national mine action strategy and work plan 
and increase donor interest as well.”
In December the authorities from North and South came together to address the Nairobi Summit 
for a Mine Free World, requesting international funding for a joint hMA, as a peace deal would 
soon be implemented. The CPA was signed a month later. In June 2005 representatives of  both 
authorities gave a joint presentation at the Geneva intersessional meeting of  the mine ban treaty. 
Current Mine Action
In November 2004 the United Nations said comprehensive mine clearance programmes in South 
Sudan were “virtually impossible before the government and the rebels started discussing peace 
and the end to the decades-long civil war.” Delays and mistrust effectively restricted many planned 
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activities in the crucial period leading up to the final agreement of  the CPA but there has been huge 
progress in HMA this year.
Substantive mine action activities (outside of  the Nuba enclave) during the conflict were limited 
by lack of  funding and delays in finalising the peace process, but since the war officially ended this 
year things have changed considerably. The total requested for HMA for 2005/6 is $82’633’630, a 
fourfold increase on the previous year and many times that spent in 2002. There has been a rapid 
internationalisation of  mine action since the peace process took hold, and a complete change in the 
nature of  mine action as multilateral agencies began to overshadow the local initiatives. 
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) became involved in mine action in 2005 as 
part of  its mandate to ensure safe return and resettlement of  IDPs and refugees. UNHCR has two 
partners: MAG and NPA, who have been supporting the UNHCR deployment in Western Equa-
toria since June 2005. The UNMIS and AMIS peacekeeping operations for the South and Darfur 
also have mine action components. 
By June 2005, 704 dangerous areas (DAs) had been identified through limited survey and com-
munity-based impact assessments. The most affected States are: Western Equatoria, Eastern Equa-
toria, Bahr al-Jabal, Bahr al-Ghazal, Lakes, Jonglei, and upper Nile in the South; South Kordofan 
(Nuba Mountains) and Blue Nile in the contested areas and Kassala and Red Sea in the east. Darfur 
is also a concern and UNMAS recently opened an information office there.
Currently, there is effectively still no unified national mine action authority in Sudan. Responsibili-
ties for mine action are shared between the North and the South with the support of  the uN Mine 
Action Office. The tripartite structure consists of: National (North/GoS) Mine Action Office sup-
ported by a National Mine Action Technical Committee (NMATC); New (South/SPLM) Sudan 
Mine Action Directorate supported by a New Sudan Authority on Landmines (NSALM); and the 
UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) with the overall task of  assisting both parties’ demining efforts 
by providing technical advice and coordination. 
Specific agreements 
In addition to the Ottawa protocol and Geneva Call Deed of  Commitment, mine ban provisions 
were included in both the Burgenstock and Machakos agreements, the ceasefire requirements and 
the CPA. At the 4th Meeting of  States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, representatives of  the GoS, 
SPLM and uNMAS agreed to a tripartite Memorandum of  understanding (Mou), signed on 19 
September 2002. The UN would “seek to help both parties to jointly develop a national mine ac-
tion strategy that meets the immediate needs of  the emergency humanitarian situation and plans 
ahead to post conflict Sudan. Such strategy will eventually lead to a mutually agreed National Mine 
Action Plan.” UNMAS, 23 Jan 2003
In August 2003 UNMAS suggested general principles for Mine Action in Sudan: 
“a) Where possible, and feasible, all intended projects should plan their activities to be cross-con-
flict in nature and seek to develop an equal capacity in both GoS and SPLM controlled areas. 
b) Where planned activities are cross-conflict they must be fully endorsed by the Sudanese Mine 
Action focal points in both GoS and SPLM. All such projects should have a clear peace-building 
component and be formalised with a tripartite Memorandum of  Agreement (MoA) between the 
Mine Action organisation the GoS and SPLM. 
c) The Project should seek to turn direct mine/UXO clearance actions into immediate and tangible 
benefits for the affected community. Such benefits may include: the rehabilitation of  mine/UXO 
cleared roads, restoring preconflict livelihood and access to basic services.”
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There is a question as to whether the SPLM is still an NSA now that it is in government. There is 
also the question of  which government it represents: the new Government of  South Sudan in Juba 
or the Government of  National Unity in Khartoum. Whilst the issue of  transition from NSA to 
stakeholder in government is clearly an interesting one in its own right, there is also the question of  
intentions and perceptions during the peace process. How much of  what each side says is reality, 
and how much is it a negotiating position? The CPA calls for both sides to work for national unity 
but until the proposed referendum on independence is conducted at the end of  the six year interim 
period in 2011, there is likely to be a continuation of  the “twin track approach” with two separate 
mine action authorities. 
Conclusions and lessons learned
Prior to the peace negotiations only one organisation, OSIL, was active in mine clearance and 
that was only in rebel-controlled areas of  the South. Subsequently almost all plans called for a 
“Crossline” approach but this has frequently been more reflected by rhetoric than by reality as 
neither side was prepared to make concessions on the ground prior to the final implementation of  
the peace process. There have been virtually no demining activities outside areas covered by inter-
nationally monitored ceasefire agreements. 
Crossline mine action was envisaged as a confidence-building measure, although the lack of  confi-
dence between the two parties appears to have instead delayed the implementation of  planned pro-
grammes as well as prevented the free flow of  information. The MoU’s in-built lack of  transpar-
ency not only delayed an effective survey of  the affected areas, it also precluded the involvement of  
the country’s underdeveloped civil society and undermined the effectiveness of  both international 
and local civil society monitoring mechanisms. 
Despite the claims of  crossline mine action cooperation and its possibilities for peace and confi-
dence-building, the complexities of  Sudan and the failure to achieve a comprehensive peace deal 
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for the entire country has meant that HMA has mostly been conditional on the existence of  the 
appropriate peace processes, rather than enabling them. It has been difficult to detect the planned 
one country approach being implemented on the ground. Prior to the CPA there was virtually no 
cooperation between the parties in the field, and afterwards the SPLM changed from being the de 
facto administration of  South Sudan into de jure rulers of  a new interim autonomous government, 
with a power-sharing role in the new federal government in Khartoum.
Repeated conflict has established deep antagonism and mistrust with little belief  on either side that 
commitments will be honoured in the long term. The specific history of  the breakdown of  the 
Addis Ababa peace agreement in 1983 has led to widespread suspicion among many southerners 
that the CPA is little but a ploy to buy time and they may need to return to arms again if  they opt 
for independence at the end of  the current interim period. It is unlikely Sudan will truly be in a 
post-conflict situation until 2011 at the earliest.
Although the CPA is between two warring parties - the GoS and SPLM - there are numerous 
other conflicts, parties and other armed groups. The war is not simply a North-South issue and 
the SPLM/A is not the sole NSA involved in the conflict, although it has been the only one ac-
tive in the Geneva Call process. There is no civil society organisation in the South comparable to 
the Sudan CBL in the North and there is extremely limited international access to the areas where 
peace has yet to be realised. The fact that there are active conflicts still ongoing in other parts of  the 
country suggests that this is not the final settlement. The areas where fighting is currently occurring 
are not covered either by the CPA or  the Geneva Call Deed of  Commitment. 
Proposals
The fact that there is now a successful HMA programme in Sudan could be viewed as a vindica-
tion of  those who claimed that humanitarian mine action was possible during an ongoing civil war. 
However, it may also be seen as the failure to find a comprehensive formula for peace.
The doctrine of  crossline demining has become something of  a mantra but such programmes 
seem entirely conditional on the existence of  a local military stand-down. Whilst the Nuba experi-
ence can be seen as a successful initiative of  mine action during conflict, in some ways, it is only 
because the war in the Nuba Mountains was essentially a separate conflict to that between the GoS 
and SPLA, even though the protagonists were nominally the same. 
The complexities of  countries like Sudan often leads to their specific political micro-environments 
being ignored by outsiders, who often fail to understand the complex dynamics at work. At the 
same time, concentration on the opportunities presented for HMA by the Nuba ceasefire diverted 
attention and resources from OSIL attempts at unilateral mine action in the south just as diplo-
matic attention towards securing the CPA for the North/South conflict diverted attention from 
the conflict in Darfur.
As an NSA, the SPLM had to work hard to gain recognition from international organisations and 
its attempts to gain an equal footing with the government led to a crossline approach being adopt-
ed, implying a unitary authority for mine action. However, the political conditionalities created by 
such an approach in many ways delayed the deployment of  HMA which was constantly affected 
by delays in the peace process. 
The repeated call for a one-country approach often fitted better with diplomatic niceties than with 
the realities on the ground. Had the local organisations been sufficiently funded, unilateral mine 
action efforts could well have made better progress. As it stands, despite the CPA’s insistence that 
both sides work for national unity, South Sudan now has its own autonomous administration. Per-
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haps it is now time for mine action organisations to start dealing with the realities on the ground 
rather than continuing the fiction that HMA in Sudan is based upon a one-country approach. In-
ternational actors should perhaps be more pragmatic and be prepared to engage with NSAs more 
openly and robustly. 
Rather than dissipating their effectiveness by trying to work within a diplomatically-defined ap-
proach, the mine action community should perhaps be more prepared to listen to the aspirations 
and intentions of  the people on the ground and offer their representatives more realistic alterna-
tives. As South Sudan strives to rebuild itself  after decades of  war and neglect, perhaps the key 
decisions on mine action strategy should be made by those most affected by the problem them-
selves. 
As Darfur continues to deteriorate and the appalling murders of  two FSD deminers last month so 
tragically demonstrate, Sudan is not yet really at peace. Future HMA should also perhaps be con-
sidered to be programmes undertaken in the midst of  conflict.
Timeline
	1955 Beginning of  first civil war between north and south.
	Jan 1956 - Sudan gains Independence
	1972 The Addis Ababa Agreement, granting autonomy for the South, ends 17 years of  civil 
war. 
	1983 War resumes. The government adopts Islamic sharia law. Southern rebels, led by John 
Garang, form Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). 
	1989 Lt. Gen. Omar Hassan al-Bashir takes power in bloodless coup.
	1996 SPLA declares moratorium on mine use
	1997 Khartoum signs Mine Ban Treaty
	1999 Sudan begins to export oil.
	2001 October SPLM/A Signs Geneva Call Deed Of  Commitment
	January 2002 Nuba Mountains Ceasefire
	July 2002 - Government and SPLM sign Machakos Protocol agreeing formula to end civil 
war. Government accepts South’s right for self-determination after six-year interim period. 
	September 2002 Tripartite MoU between UN SPLM and GoS heralds start of  international 
mine action 
	February 2003 Start of  large scale fighting in Darfur
	September 2003 Geneva Call Mine Ban Workshop at Garang’s HQ in New Site
	October 2003 Government ratifies Mine Ban Treaty
	May 2004 Government and southern rebels agree on power-sharing protocols. 
	August 2004 National Mine Action Policy Framework and Strategy endorsed by the GoS and 
SPLM 
	November-December 2004 Nairobi Summit for a Mine Free World. Joint SPLM/GoS del-
egation 
	January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, ends North/South civil war. Conflicts in 
Darfur and East continue.
	April 2005 Donors conference in Norway pledges $4.5 billion to help South Sudan recover 
from the war.
	June 2005 Joint SPLM/GoS presentation at Geneva intersessional meeting.
	July 2005 Garang takes office as first vice president. Three weeks later, Garang dies in a heli-
copter crash in southern Sudan. Deputy Salva Kiir takes his place.
	July 2005 Mine Ban Workshop in Rumbek
	August 2005 Formation of  Government of  National Unity and semi-autonomous Govern-
ment of  South Sudan
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Sri Lanka
Ms Katherine Kramer (on behalf  of  Mr Chandru Pararajasingham), 
Mine Action in the Midst of  Internal Conflict: 
Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO)
Sri Lanka, then known as Ceylon, gained its independence from the British in 1948. At the time, 
it seemed ready for self-rule, having enjoyed universal franchise since 1931, long before any of  the 
other colonies. In fact, it was known as the “Island without problems”.
However, in 1958, this illusion changed. The island was engulfed in anti-Tamil violence that con-
tinued for the next 25 years, and culminated in the riots of  July 1983. 
In the 1970’s, programmes were launched that were considered discriminatory against the Tamils, 
eliciting a violent response from Tamil communities. The first reaction was in the form of  sporadic 
attacks against the Government’s agents (police and army) stationed in Tamil regions. However, by 
the 1980’s, the violence had escalated into a civil war. 
Between 1983 and 1987, following an agreement between the Government and some of  the Tamil 
armed groups (with the exception of  the Liberation Tigers of  Tamil Eelam [LTTE]), the Govern-
ment of  India intervened by sending a peace keeping force charged with “disarming” the Tamils 
on behalf  of  the government. The situation worsened and, in the end, the Indian troops departed, 
having failed in their task.
In 1994, Chandrika Kumaratunga was elected president with an overwhelming majority supporting 
her peace endeavours. A ceasefire agreement was signed between the LTTE and the government 
the same year. However, after an initial series of  discussions, the peace process failed and renewed 
hostilities broke out after a few months. 
Mined zones in the North of  Sri Lanka
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The war intensified after 1995 with major displacements of  communities in the Northeast. Army 
camps proliferated in the same region resulting in the laying of  landmines for defensive as well as 
offensive purposes.
In February 2002, another ceasefire was signed between the LTTE and the government, facilitated 
by the Government of  Norway. One of  the main priorities of  the agreement was the resettlement 
of  internally displaced persons (IDPs). To achieve this, extensive mine clearance needed to be un-
dertaken. It was clear that the support and expertise of  international mine action agencies would 
be required to address this mammoth humanitarian task. 
The Ceasefire agreement has remained in force for almost 4 years, though there have been numer-
ous reports of  violations to the agreement by both sides. 
Mine/iED Status 
According to the Landmine Monitor 2005 report, between 1.5 and 2 million mines were planted 
during the conflict. In April 2005, Sri Lanka reported over 150 square kilometres of  known and 
suspected mine/UXO affected land. 
During nearly two decades of  conflict, both the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) and the LTTE used anti-
personnel mines extensively for both defensive and offensive purposes. Increased fighting in 2000 
and 2001 resulted in increased use of  antipersonnel mines by both sides. Since December 2001, 
there have been no confirmed reports of  new mine use by either the Government of  Sri Lanka or 
the LTTE. Nevertheless, there were allegations made by the LTTE about mine use in August 2004 
and in June 2005 about an armed group supported by the Sri Lankan military. The army has denied 
these accusations.
Types of  mines used by the government:
	P4, Type 69, P3 Mk 1 & P4 Mk1 
      (Pakistan)
	Type 69, Type 72 & Type 72A (China)
	VS/50 (Italy/Singapore)
	NR409/PRB (Belgium)
	M409 & M696, PRB 409 (Portugal)
	M18A1 Claymore mine (US)
	PRB 413 (Pakistan/Portuguese)
Types of  mines/iEDs used by the LTTE:
A Jony 95 (wooden box)
B Jony 99/Rangan 99 (copy of  the Pakistani 
P4 Mk1)
C SN 96 (Claymore type)
D Amman 2000 (AV mine) 
Mine Action Activities 
•	Mine Clearance
The first demining activities for humanitarian purposes began in 1999 with the launch of  the 
Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation’s Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU), operating exclusively in 
LTTE-controlled areas of  the Northeast. At the time, the extent of  the minefields was unknown, 
as proper surveying had not been carried out and minefield maps were unavailable. 
However, following the 2002 ceasefire agreement, mine clearance has been undertaken in both the 
Government-held and the LTTE-controlled areas with the help of  local and international organisa-
tions.
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Empowerment (in collaboration with 
the Indian NGOs horizon and Sarvat-
ra)
	Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention







Mine clearance, in addition to MRE and Victim assistance, is overseen by the National Steering Com-
mittee for Mine Action which reviews and approves national priorities for mine action. Chaired by 
the Secretary of  the Ministry of  Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation, it has representatives from 
relevant ministries, government agents, TRO, donors, mine action operators, UNDP and UNICEF. It 
is based in Colombo and meets every six weeks.
Prioritisation, operational coordination and tasking are provided by regional mine action offices in all 
mine-affected areas. TRO has also established a Regional Mine Action Office (RMAO) in Kilinoch-
chi with the assistance of  UNDP to oversee the coordination of  Mine Action activities. The RMAO 
undertakes tracking of  demining activities, oversees needs prioritisation and liaises with TRO’s inter-
national demining partners.
•	Mine Risk Education
MRE is conducted by four national NGOs: Sarvodaya, White Pigeon, Community Trust Fund (CTF) 
and the Tamil Refugee Rehabilitation Organisation, and by Mines Advisory Group working with White 
Pigeon and HDU. UNICEF provides assistance to local NGOs and the Ministry of  Education.
•	Victim Assistance
In the past, Sri Lanka reportedly had sufficient transportation and medical infrastructure to provide 
the necessary medical care to civilian landmine casualties. However, following the tsunami in Decem-
ber 2004, major damage was inflicted on the health sector, particularly in the Northeast. 
Several prosthetics clinics are available to respond to the physical rehabilitation needs of  victims.
There are also organisations and centres that provide physical rehabilitation, psychological support and 
socio-economic reintegration activities.
In the LTTE-controlled areas of  the Northeast, these activities are undertaken by White Pigeon, an-
other arm of  the TRO, as well as by other NGOs.
Sri Lankan military survivors receive full rehabilitation within the armed services.
Politicization of  mine activities
Mine action is intricately linked with the peace process, specifically as the rehabilitation and resettle-
ment of  IDPs is part and parcel to the ceasefire agreement, which is dependent on mine clearance and 
the HSZ.
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There has also been a lot of  pressure placed on both parties by the international and national com-
munities to make mine ban commitments (the government by acceding to the MBT and the LTTE 
by signing the Geneva Call Deed of  Commitment). Donor governments have increasingly shown 
hesitation in funding mine action programmes without such a commitment. Both parties however 
have shown some reservations to making such a commitment so long as there is no significant 
progress towards peace.
This said, even as peace talks have stalled, significant demining activities have continued unabated 
and steadfast. 
Role of  State/NSA & International community 
The government and LTTE continue to support mine action.
The international community is also continuing its support for mine action while hoping to achieve 
a breakthrough in commitments to the total ban on AP mines.
Challenges
A The tsunami not only devastated the health care system, but it also delayed mine clearance by 
some 3 to 6 months as well as changing the prioritisation for mine clearance.
B Obstacles have occurred to the smooth conduct of  mine action, most notably in relation to 
difficulties in the transportation of  equipment from government-controlled areas to LTTE-
controlled areas.
C The political and military uncertainties and lack of  confidence between parties significantly 
hamper progress towards the ban.
D The ground reality of  “no war/no peace” has created a situation where the parties to the con-
flict could use mines if  hostilities broke out.
E Landmine-affected areas are confined to the Northeast, and the national press, based primarily 
in the South has demonstrated a lack of  interest in the mine problem and its victims.
Conclusions and lessons learned
Sri Lanka, with a total square mile area of  25’332, has a significant landmine problem. Due to the 
ceasefire agreement that is currently being maintained, the mine action programme in the last four 
years has significantly reduced the problem, as well as creating awareness among the mine-affected 
population as to the danger.
The overwhelming evidence that no new mines have been planted is encouraging. The hope that 
the two parties to the conflict could agree on a ban on landmines would be a factor that would 
encourage the International community to support mine action in Sri Lanka.
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Legal Aspects of Mine Action
Mrs Kathleen, Lawand Legal Adviser to the iCRC, Mines-Arms unit,
Mine Action in the Midst of  Internal Conflict: Legal Aspects*
introduction
This paper aims to provide an overview of  the legal aspects of  mine action in situations of  inter-
nal armed conflict, relating in particular to the allocation of  responsibility for mine action in areas 
controlled by armed non-State actors (hereafter referred to as NSAs).
I was provided with a series of  questions to assist me in preparing this paper. These are dealt with 
in the last part of  the paper, applying the legal theory outlined in the first parts.
When referring to the responsibility of  States, this paper assumes that they are party to the Ottawa 
Convention.
Key obligations under the Ottawa Convention
There are essentially two types of  obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of  Anti-
personnel Mines (hereafter referred to as the Ottawa Convention):
First, there are the “don’ts”, i.e. the obligations “not to do” certain things, in other words, the pro-
hibitions. These are the activities listed in Article 1, paragraph 1 of  the Convention, i.e. the prohibi-
tion to use, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, and to assist anyone 
in carrying out prohibited activities.
Then there are the “dos”, i.e. the obligations “to do” certain things, that is to perform certain acts. 
The acts that States Parties to the Ottawa Convention are required to perform can be essentially 
summarised as:
•	 acts aimed at eliminating anti-personnel mines (stockpile destruction and mine clearance), 
•	 acts aimed at protecting civilians while awaiting the completion of  mine clearance (“mine 
awareness” for example), and 
•	 acts aimed at caring for mine victims (victim assistance).
This "to do" list makes up what is commonly known as "mine action”, although that term is not 
used anywhere in the Convention.
What I am being asked to discuss in this paper is who is responsible for carrying out the items 
on the “to do list” and what is the scope of  their responsibility in the territory of  a State Party to 
the Ottawa Convention that is under the control of  NSAs. The answers to that question come in 
part from an examination of  who is responsible for respecting the Convention’s “don’ts” – i.e. the 
prohibitions.
*On her personal capacity, see p. 6
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Who is bound by the Convention’s prohibitions?
The prohibitions of  the Ottawa Convention bind all persons on the territory of  a State Party to the 
Convention, be they government agents, members of  NSAs or lone individuals. This holds true 
even in parts of  the territory that are not under the control of  the State.
By definition, a treaty is an agreement between States, which are the primary subjects of  interna-
tional law. There is therefore no option for NSAs to join international treaties, but paradoxically 
treaties concluded between States can create legal obligations for NSAs. A good example of  trea-
ties that expressly bind armed NSAs are the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in particular common Arti-
cle 3 applying to non-international armed conflicts, and their Second Additional Protocol of  1977, 
the treaties containing the main rules of  International Humanitarian Law (IHL). They require all 
parties to an internal armed conflict, be they government forces or armed NSAs, to respect certain 
rules, such as for example the obligation to treat humanely and protect persons that are not, or 
are no longer, taking part in hostilities (e.g. wounded combatants, prisoners of  war, and of  course 
civilians).
One of  the fundamental rules of  IhL is that, in conducting hostilities, combatants must at all times 
distinguish between on the one hand military targets, which combatants are allowed to attack, and 
on the other hand civilians and civilian objects, which combatants are prohibited from attacking. 
In this connection, IHL prohibits “indiscriminate attacks”, that is attacks that are incapable of  
distinguishing military targets from civilians. This rule is important to bear in mind in relation to 
landmines. As stated in the preamble to the Ottawa Convention, the ban on anti-personnel mines 
is based on this rule.
The Ottawa Convention creates obligations primarily for the States Parties. The obligations to per-
form certain acts (the “dos”) and the prohibitions (the “don’ts”) are formulated as the obligations 
of  “each State Party”. Unlike the Geneva Conventions, the Ottawa Convention does not expressly 
refer to non-State parties to a conflict. Nonetheless, NSAs as individuals, like all other individuals 
within the territory of  a State Party, must respect the obligations contracted by that State in the 
Ottawa Convention and in particular, they must not engage in any of  the activities prohibited by 
the Convention.
In order to ensure that all individuals within its territory respect the Ottawa Convention’s prohibi-
tions (the “don’ts”), each State Party is required by Article 9 to adopt national legislation enabling 
prosecution and punishment of  violations.
How does all this fit in with the “dos”, that is the “mine action” obligations of  the Convention? 
Well, if  all persons in a State Party’s territory are prohibited from using and stockpiling anti-person-
nel mines, it should follow that if  they retain stockpiles and maintain minefields, they would be in 
violation of  the prohibition to retain and to use anti-personnel mines. I will return to this issue in 
a moment.
With that background in mind, I wish now to turn to the question of  a State Party’s responsibility 
for mine action in areas controlled by NSAs.
56. This section is based on elements developed in more detail in a paper on legal issues relating to engaging NSAs in the Ottawa 
Convention which the author contributed to Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines (ed.), Looking Back, Looking Forward, Les-
sons Learned in Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban, Papers and Proceedings of  a Workshop on 13 September 2003 in 
Bangkok, Thailand, ICBL and Geneva Call, 2004.
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is a State Party to the Ottawa Convention responsible for mine action in parts of  its territory 
controlled by NSAs?
The mine action requirements of  the Convention are to be performed by the State Party, i.e. the gov-
ernment. This is very clear from the text of  the treaty, which identifies the subject of  the obligations 
as “each State Party”.
But how can the government perform acts on a part of  its territory that it does not control? This 
question can be answered by taking a closer look at the wording of  the mine action provisions of  the 
Convention, in particular of  Articles 4 and 5 dealing with stockpile destruction and mine surveying, 
awareness and clearance:
“Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of  all stockpiled anti-personnel 
mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control…” (Art. 4)
“Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction and of  all anti-personnel mines 
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control.” (Art. 5(1))
“Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control 
in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced, and shall ensure [that 
measures are taken] to ensure the effective exclusion of  civilians…” (Art. 5(2))
Several observations can be drawn from the wording of  these provisions. First, in relation to the 
scope of  the obligation – mines under the State Party’s “jurisdiction or control” -- it is significant that 
the term “and” was not used. This appears to indicate that even if  a State does not control a part of  
its territory, on which it however has “jurisdiction” in the sense of  “sovereignty”, it is still in principle 
obliged to carry out stockpile destruction and mine clearance pursuant to Articles 4 and 5.
But surely this is unrealistic: how can a State perform its mine action obligations in territory it does 
not control? This is where the second significant feature of  Articles 4 and 5 comes into play, in the 
use of  the terms “destroy or ensure the destruction” and “shall ensure” other mine action measures to 
protect civilians. This would indicate that if  for some reason the State Party is not in a position to 
itself  destroy anti-personnel mines within its jurisdiction or control, it must nonetheless “ensure their 
destruction”. So how can a State party to the Ottawa Convention “ensure the destruction” of  anti-
personnel mines located in parts of  its territory that are not under its control?
A fundamental rule of  the law of  treaties, embodied in the Latin maxim pacta sunt servanda, is that 
States party to a treaty must perform their obligations under that treaty in good faith. According to 
the rules of  treaty interpretation, “good faith” means that a State is required to “refrain from any acts 
calculated to prevent the due execution of  the treaty or otherwise frustrate its objects.”
Taking the obligation to “ensure the destruction” of  anti-personnel mines, the good faith perform-
ance of  this requirement arguably means that, at the very least, a State Party must, to the extent feasi-
ble and within the means at its disposal, facilitate efforts to clear and destroy mines in the parts of  its 
territory that are controlled by NSAs.
In interpreting and implementing the Convention’s mine action obligations in relation to areas con-
trolled by NSAs, the Convention’s provisions on international cooperation and assistance (Article 6) 
should also be taken into account. Pursuant to these provisions, a State Party has the right to seek and 
57.  The rule of  pacta sunt servanda is codified as follows in Article 26 of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties: “Every 
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”
58. Article 55(2) of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties.
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receive assistance if  need be from other States Parties and international organisations and NGOs. 
This would arguably include the right to seek assistance from other States Parties and relevant actors 
to enable mine action activities in areas that the government does not control.
Under the law of  State responsibility, a State may justify its failure to implement its obligations on the 
grounds of  what is known as “force majeure” -- meaning events which are outside of  the control of  the 
State. Article 23 of  the UN Draft Articles on State Responsibility, drawn up by the International Law 
Commission, provides:
“The wrongfulness of  an act of  a State not in conformity with an international obligation of  
that State is precluded if  the act is due to force majeure, that is the occurrence of  an irresistible 
force or of  an unforeseen event, beyond the control of  the State, making it materially impos-
sible in the circumstances to perform the obligation.”
In this context, the term “act of  a State” includes a failure to perform a legal obligation, such as for 
example mine action obligations under the Ottawa Convention. This provision essentially means that 
a State will not be legally responsible for non-compliance with its treaty obligations if  it is materially 
impossible for it to carry them out.
In its Commentary to this provision, the International Law Commission has qualified “material im-
possibility” as including events due to “human intervention”, for example “loss of  control over a 
portion of  the State’s territory as a result of  an insurrection or devastation of  an area by military 
operations carried out by a third State.” The Commentary goes on to say that “the wrongfulness of  
the State’s conduct is precluded for so long as the situation of  force majeure subsists.”0
Therefore a State Party to the Ottawa Convention may be able to justify its non-compliance with its 
mine action obligations only so long as a non-international armed conflict continues and as parts of  
its territory escape from its control, if  not its jurisdiction. In other words, the justification for non-
performance of  the Convention requirements is only temporary.
I wish to re-emphasise that the State Party must at all times act in good faith. As Stuart Maslen has 
put it in his Commentary to the Ottawa Convention: “A State that is unable, for reasons beyond its 
control, to implement certain obligations, can legitimately claim to be acting in good faith as long as it 
does not exploit an internal armed conflict in order to avoid implementing all of  its obligations.”
In sum, a State Party to the Ottawa Convention can justify its failure to fulfil its mine action obliga-
tions in areas of  its territory that it does not control, for as long as it does not control those areas, but 
it is still bound to make “good faith” efforts to perform its treaty obligations. In particular, it must:
•	refrain from deliberately preventing the execution of  the treaty in those areas of  its terri-
tory that it does not control; and
•	 facilitate efforts made by third parties (e.g. other States, international organisations or 
NGOs) to carry out mine action in those areas and, if  feasible, facilitate such efforts made 
by the NSAs themselves.
59. International Law Commission, « Articles on Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts », General Assembly 
Official Records, Supplement No. 10, A/56/10, 2001, at p.48.
60. Ibid., at p.184.
61. S. Maslen, Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties Vol. I: The Convention on the Prohibition of  the Use, Stockpiling, Produc-
tion, and Transfer of  Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Oxford University Press, 2004, at p.152.
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This brings me to the concluding part of  my presentation, where I will attempt to answer the ques-
tions that have been put to me in light of  the above-mentioned legal framework.
Questions regarding the responsibility for mine action in areas controlled by NSAs
1. Are mine action activities in areas controlled by NSAs under the responsibility of  
the State?
They most definitely continue to be the responsibility of  the State party to the Ottawa Con-
vention, but the non-performance of  mine action would be justified by the fact that the 
State Party does not control the territory and that it is therefore under a “material impos-
sibility” to carry out these activities. However, the State Party must at all times act in good 
faith, and in particular it should not act in such a way as to prevent the Convention from 
being executed in the parts of  its territory that it does not control. In particular, it should 
not obstruct efforts made by others to clear mines and carry out other mine action activi-
ties. This stems from the State Party’s obligation under Articles 4 and 5 of  the Convention 
to “ensure” that mine action is carried out, and would include the obligation to facilitate ef-
forts made by third parties (e.g. mine action organisations) or even, where feasible, by the 
NSAs themselves.
2. is a refusal by a State Party to allow mine action activities in areas controlled by 
NSAs a violation of  the Ottawa Convention?
Depending on the circumstances, such refusal could amount to a violation of  the State’s 
obligation to “ensure the destruction” of  stockpiled anti-personnel mines and of  mines 
in the ground, among other mine action measures. For example, if  a State Party arbitrar-
ily -- i.e. without due regard to the humanitarian needs and opportunities on the ground 
-- refuses to allow mine action activities proposed by willing and able third parties in areas 
controlled by NSAs, it would be difficult for it to argue that it is under a “material impos-
sibility” to perform its treaty obligations in those areas. Moreover, its refusal would most 
certainly constitute a violation of  the Convention if  it is shown to amount to an act “cal-
culated to prevent the due execution of  the treaty or otherwise frustrate its objects” (per 
above-cited Commentary of  the International Law Commission).
3. What is the responsibility of  the State vis-à-vis its own population living in areas 
under the control of  NSAs?
I believe this question refers to the duty of  States to protect their population from the 
effects of  mines, notably through marking and fencing, and mine risk education. Again, 
because the Convention provision (Art. 5(2)) is formulated as an obligation to ensure, there 
is a duty to facilitate efforts by third parties, such as mine action organisations, or where 
feasible by NSAs themselves, to carry out mine action.
4. in particular, under the Ottawa Convention, what is the responsibility of  the State 
vis-à-vis the victims of  mines laid by NSAs?
A State party to the Ottawa Convention has the responsibility to care for all mine victims 
within its jurisdiction or control, regardless of  whose mines caused the casualties. There 
can be no discrimination against victims on the grounds that they were injured by the acts 
of  NSAs or third parties.
The victim assistance obligation under the Convention is formulated as one of  “interna-
tional cooperation and assistance”. In particular, pursuant to Article 6(3) of  the Conven-
tion, the duty of  States Parties to assist mine victims is incumbent on all States Parties 
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– both mine-affected States and other States that are “in a position to” provide assistance 
to victims.
But again, whether the State Party can carry out its obligations in the parts of  its territory 
that escape its control depends on what is materially possible under the circumstances. At 
the very least, the State must not prevent victim assistance activities from being carried 
out by third parties, or by NSAs themselves, and it must facilitate the carrying out of  these 
activities in any way that it can, for example by allowing humanitarian organisations to have 
access to the said territories.
This is also in line with the duties of  parties to an armed conflict, under International Hu-
manitarian Law and Human Rights Law, to allow entry, passage and distribution of  impar-
tial and neutral humanitarian assistance to civilian populations in need.
5. Who is responsible for the destruction of  stockpiles belonging to NSAs?
In principle, the State Party is responsible in accordance with Article 4 which, as previously 
mentioned, continues to apply even if  the State is not in control of  the territory. Again, ap-
plying this obligation in good faith, the State Party must at least refrain from acting in such 
a way as to prevent stockpile destruction from taking place. Pursuant to its obligation to 
comply with the treaty in “good faith” and to “ensure” that stockpile destruction can take 
place, it must facilitate efforts that may be made by others (e.g. mine action organisations) 
to do so.
6. Are NSAs obliged to carry out mine action in the areas they control (always assum-
ing that the State is party to the Ottawa Convention)?
As mentioned earlier, NSAs are bound to respect the prohibitions of  the Ottawa Conven-
tion.
Accordingly, the prohibition to stockpile anti-personnel mines would require the NSA to 
destroy stockpiles in its possession. The NSA would also be required to clear minefields 
in the areas it controls, to the extent that leaving the mines in the ground may constitute 
“use”, which is absolutely prohibited by the Convention.
Pending clearance of  minefields, the NSA should facilitate or engage in related mine ac-
tion activities, i.e. mine risk education and risk reduction in the areas it controls. This also 
stems from the general International humanitarian Law requirement to protect the civilian 
population from the effects of  hostilities. Similarly, NSAs would also be required to allow 
access to the areas under their control by impartial and neutral humanitarian organisations 
providing assistance for mine and other war victims.
62. See Ruth Abril Stoffels, « Legal regulation of  humanitarian assistance in armed conflict : Achievements and gaps », International 





 Mrs Simona Beltrami, 
Coordinator of  the italian Campaign to Ban Landmines 
Co-chair of  the NSA Working Group – ICBL
I would like to echo the words of  Ambassador Lint in the opening, acknowledging that, in the 
past five years, the international community has really come a long way with regard to recognising 
the need to engage non-State armed groups in efforts to achieve a truly universal ban on land-
mines. 
The growing recognition of  this need has been achieved thanks to the tireless work of  NGOs 
like Geneva Call and member campaigns of  the ICBL, who – despite many dangers and difficult 
conditions – work day in day out in many countries to engage with non-State armed groups on hu-
manitarian issues. Thanks to their efforts, the necessity of  entering into a dialogue with non-State 
armed groups with a view to achieving a total mine ban, has been sanctioned by statements and 
resolutions in authoritative fora including Meetings of  the States Parties of  the Ottawa Conven-
tion, the Nairobi Action Plan for a mine free world, produced during the 1st Review Conference of  
the Convention, as well as the European Parliament. 
Still, we cannot deny that there is still staunch resistance from many quarters to efforts to work 
with non-State armed groups towards the goal of  a mine-free world. The issue of  non-State ac-
tors’ involvement in the mine ban process remains highly politically charged, like everything that 
concerns these groups. 
And yet, today’s presentations, in all their diversity and complexity, reminded us brilliantly of  what 
lies behind the smoke screen of  the political battles around legitimization of  armed groups. And 
what lies behind this is the human suffering of  communities caught in the cross fire of  civil con-
flicts, stuck in minefields, whose basic rights – life, physical integrity, access to resources, freedom 
of  movement – are constantly being denied because of  mine use. The case studies presented today 
clearly illustrated the need to create safe spaces for communities and individuals through the facili-
tation of  humanitarian mine action even in the midst of  conflict. And they spelt out the need for 
all of  us who work on the landmine issue to step up our efforts to take the process of  engaging 
non-State armed groups yet one step further, thus allowing the saving of  innocent lives to take 
place even as war continues.
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Mr Pascal Bongard, 
Programme Director for Africa, Geneva Call
On behalf  of  the organizers, Geneva Call and the ICBL Non-State Actors Working Group, I 
would like to thank all of  you for having participated in and contributed to this workshop.
Special thanks must go to our speakers for their very rich and interesting presentations, and to 
Ambassador Jean Lint who kindly accepted the invitation to chair this meeting.
I think this workshop shows that mine action in the midst of  internal armed conflict is possible. 
In Sudan, the government and SPLM/A agreed to renounce the use of  AP mines whilst the war 
was still being fought, and the Government of  Colombia chose to sign the MBT despite its own 
internal conflict. Moreover, in Sudan but also in Sri Lanka, mine risk education, victim assistance 
and even demining began during wartime.
 
Of  course, there are many challenges and obstacles to such work. For instance, the Sudanese ex-
ample teaches us that progress in mine action is often conditioned by progress in peace negotia-
tions. Similarly, there may be reluctance among the opposing parties to commit to a total ban on 
AP mines, as has been seen in Sri Lanka. Alternatively, the issue might become politicised, with 
the actors involved demonstrating less cooperation with mine action efforts as a result; this was 
evident in the refusal of  the Government of  Colombia to grant authorisation for international 
verification in Micoahumado and in the obstruction of  the transportation of  demining equipment 
encountered in Sri Lanka. What is more, continued fighting and insecurity will inevitably hamper 
mine action efforts, as will scepticism and a lack of  support by the international community, par-
ticularly donors.
These challenges are real, but they should not discourage us. I see two main reasons why this is 
so:
Firstly, a country may be at war, but there are likely to be pockets of  relative stability conducive to 
mine action. Indeed, this was the case in some areas of  Southern Sudan and Sri Lanka. It is also 
descriptive of  the situation in Somalia, where important mine action projects, including demining 
and stockpile destruction, have been running for several years in northern regions. Similar develop-
ments have been observed in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991.
Regional disparities do therefore exist in conflicts; in zones where war is over or stability exists, it is 
not necessary to wait for a comprehensive settlement of  the conflict before trying to initiate some 
degree of  mine action. This point was well encapsulated in the course of  the workshop in the com-
ment that: “it’s not necessary to have peace to start saving lives”.
Secondly, granting that in situations of  armed conflict only limited mine action can take place, there 
is room for progress within these restrictions. For example, in many cases, advocacy, MRE and 
victim assistance work is possible. Demining is more problematic as it might be militarily driven, 
and recovered mines might be recycled or cleared areas mined again. It could also be problematic, 
if  not impossible, to begin demining operations for security reasons. Even so, we have heard that 
local initiatives have been taken in Southern Sudan (OSIL since 1997), as well as in Sri Lanka (HDU 
since 1999). These initiatives are helpful not only because they have served to reduce the mine 
threat but also because they lay the ground for a comprehensive mine action effort once peace has 
been achieved, as is happening now in Southern Sudan.

So, to conclude, a variable-geometry approach whereby mine action is taken to different lengths ac-
cording to the exigencies of  a conflict, is very important and worthy of  increased support including 
in areas under the control of  NSAs.




Clearly, this workshop brought together a richness of  different views on, and experiences of, 
mine action in the course of  armed conflicts. Even so, some common conclusions have emerged. 
Firstly, all contributors to the workshop more or less agreed on a basic point: mine action is pos-
sible in the midst of  war and armed dispute. From Asia, Africa and South America, representatives 
were able to bear testament to this fact, bringing with them concrete examples of  how advocacy, 
mine clearance, victim assistance, Mine Risk Education and stockpile destruction, may be under-
taken in spite of  hostilities. 
Secondly, if  mine action is to be carried out, then it must be done so for humanitarian reasons. We 
must prioritise helping the communities that are afflicted by a landmine problem, whether in terms 
of  removing the mines, educating the local population about the risks that they face, or providing 
assistance to mine victims. If, on the contrary, mine action is performed from a military standpoint, 
then it enters into the logic of  the conflict itself. In these circumstances, combatants may re-use the 
mines taken from the ground, or employ cleared areas for their own use. Demining must benefit 
civilians first, and giving ownership of  it to the military may subvert their interests.
Thirdly, mine action should be depoliticised. In Colombia, the political agenda has meant that the 
government has been unwilling to negotiate with NSAs, even in the name of  a dialogue focuss-
ing on ways and means to reduce the impact of  landmines on the civilian population. Equally, the 
LTTE and Government of  Sri Lanka have tied any commitment to adhere to a full mine ban to 
the contingencies of  the ongoing conflict. Indeed, the evidence from these cases is that an overly 
political dimension is likely to affect mine action for the worse. 
Fourthly, a failure to perform mine action in the course of  an armed conflict may be deemed as 
non-respect of  the MBT. As Kathleen Lawand explained, although a signatory State might be pre-
vented from implementing the provisions of  the MBT in those parts of  its territory that are not 
under its control, the State and the NSAs operating in that area should nevertheless endeavour to 
carry out mine action according to the spirit of  the MBT. To this end, the State should facilitate, 
or at least not prevent, any mine action efforts by third parties or the NSAs themselves. Indeed, 
Action #46 of  the Nairobi Action Plan urges States in a position to do so to:
“Continue to support, as appropriate, mine action to assist affected populations in areas 
under the control of  armed non-State actors, particularly in areas under the control of  actors 
which have agreed to abide by the Convention’s norms”
Recognising this responsibility is, however, only a first step. The important effort that must now be 
undertaken is to ensure that States take this responsibility seriously and that they act on it. 
Finally, the discussion presented further evidence for what is already considered a possible conse-
quence of  mine action in the course of  armed conflict, namely that it leads to confidence building 
between the sides to the dispute. Certainly, negotiations on this subject, such as agreements to 
allow mine action in a conflict zone, might serve as an avenue to discussion on other more conten-
tious issues.

This workshop therefore left its participants with the certainty that mine action in the midst of  an 
internal conflict is both possible and a humanitarian imperative. Not every region in a war-torn 
country will be affected by warfare and it is in such areas that mine action may be undertaken in 
different forms according to what is possible. This is likely to provide immediate benefits to the 
local population, as well as to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive mine action effort once 
peace has been made. 
Indeed, one must not wait until the last bullet is fired before seeking ways and means to prevent the 
human suffering caused by landmines. 
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